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ABSTRACT 
Tradable Discharge Permit (TDP) programs have shown, both in practice and in theory, to have 
tremendous potential as cost-effective methods of pollution control. Nevertheless, there are still many 
uncertainties regarding TDP programs that if not adequately addressed, might impair their success. 
Concerns range from issues of market failure that prevents optimal trading, to political agendas that differ 
from a typical TDP program in their priorities, to modeling difficulties that might cause erroneous 
predictions of cost savings and environmental performance. The hopelessness of trying to overcome 
these concerns all at once is recognized. And therefore, apart from a brief discussion where the more 
common of these uncertainties are identified and discussed, attention is focused only on the uncertainty 
associated with environmental modeling, specifically that associated with the stochastic aquatic 
environment. 
Numerous studies have been carried out to predict the potential impacts of TDP programs, whether 
positive or negative, on the environment they are intended to protect. These studies have been 
invaluable in laying essential groundwork for the further understanding and actual implementation of such 
programs. However, many of these studies assumed deterministic environmental models when in reality 
nothing is ever constant. The environment is an open system vulnerable to, amongst many other agents, 
weather variations and changes in microbial behavior. It is therefore, this study's goal to attempt to 
advance a step forward by re-assessing those same questions asked many times before, but this time 
without disregarding the stochastic nature of the environment. 
The Willamette and Athabasca Rivers in Oregon, USA and Alberta, Canada, respectively are used as 
example case studies. These systems are simulated to predict how they might respond if discharge 
permit trading were implemented. The Mean-Value First-Order Second-Moment (MFOSM) method is 
used to evaluate the reliability of each system's dissolved oxygen (DO) concentration meeting set 
standards, as a function of its BOD wasteload distribution and environmental randomness. The results 
show that trading does indeed influence environment quality. For the Willamette River, trading improves 
the water quality reliability. For the Athabasca River, trading makes the reliability worse. However, these 
effects are quite minimal in that, for any target reliability to be achieved that is reasonable, trading is 
found not to change the reliability significantly in comparison to that attained under a policy of no trading. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
As the need to protect the environment becomes more obvious, the proper planning and management of 
increasingly scarce environmental resources becomes more urgent. Effective environmental 
management involves the implementation of policies that are able to safeguard the environment, but 
without sacrificing economic development. Needless to say, there exists a tradeoff between 
environmental quality, and the cost of achieving and maintaining that quality. 
The formulation of conscientious policies often requires predictions of the actions of certain parties and 
how those actions might affect environmental quality. The fickleness of human behavior makes it difficult 
for such predictions to be accurate. This is further complicated by the stochastic nature of the 
environment. In general, waste discharge regulations can be categorized into two groups. The first is the 
more traditional and familiar "command-and-control" policies; and the second is the more innovative but 
less tested "market-based" policies. 
While command-and-control policies have served well in the past, and even presently, they have faced 
heavy criticism for not giving industry sufficient ftexibility, which results in economic inefficiency. Such 
policies, that place explicit restrictions on allowable levels of emissions and/or force the use of specific 
pollution abatement technologies, simply do not give industry the freedom to adopt cost-saving measures 
as it sees appropriate. Neither do these policies give any incentive for industry to reduce their pollution 
levels beyond the standards required by law. 
In recent years, market-based policies have been gaining popularity as alternatives that address these 
shortcomings. One such policy is the utilization of tradable discharge permits to regulate polluters. 
Under this policy, the action to pollute is seen as a property right with tangible value that is transferable. 
Theoretical studies [Montgomery, 1972; Brill et al, 1984; Baumol & Oates, 1988], as well as practical 
experience [Schmalensee et al, 1998; Stavins, 1998; Schwarze & Zapfel, 2000], have proven the 
tremendous potential Tradable Discharge Permit (TOP) programs carry as a cost-effective means of 
pollution control. 
However, there is still much uncertainty of the inner workings and implications of TOP programs that if not 
adequately addressed, might impair their success. These uncertainties, of which some are quantifiable 
but most are not, are as random as they are diverse. Concerns range from issues of market failure that 
prevents optimal trading, to p:>litical agendas that differ in their priorities, to modeling difficulties that might 
cause erroneous estimations of cost savings and environmental performance. 
This study attempts to address some of these concerns. Naturally, it is hopeless to try to overcome these 
issues all at once. And thus, apart from a brief review where the more common of these issues are 
identified and discussed, attention is focused only on the ones that are less abstract and more tangible. 
More specifically, for the time being, uncertainties of politics, psychology, trading and such are assumed 
negligible and only uncertainty related to the stochastic environment is considered. For now, it is 
conveniently assumed that perfect market conditions apply such that trading ultimately leads to some 
predictable, deterministic, least cost equilibrium. 
Due to the nature of environmental permit trading programs, where the locations of discharge may 
change, it is advantageous to know a priori how trading might impact environmental quality. Regardless 
of its cost efficiency, a program that fails to protect the environment falls short of its primary objective. To 
assess this question of how trading might impact the environment, mathematical models are used to 
simulate how the environment might respond to certain market behaviors. However the task of 
developing an adequately accurate environmental-response model, and collecting the required data, is 
not without difficulty. Many of the studies carried out in the past [Montgomery, 1972, Eheart, 1980; Brill et 
al, 1984; Eheart et al, 1987] applied deterministic models that neglect the stochastic nature of the 
environment. This negligence, though convenient and perhaps computationally necessary in the past, led 
to results that did not wholly represent reality. Thus, the primary objective of this study is to re-examine 
this issue of the environmental impact of permit trading, but this time with stochastic models that are 
better able to characterize the true state of the environment. 
To achieve the objectives of this study, the cases of the Willamette River in Oregon, USA and the 
Athabasca River in Alberta, Canada are used as example case studies. Both systems are modeled to 
observe how they might behave if permit trading were allowed. In both cases, environmental quality is 
measured as the reliability of the dissolved oxygen (DO) concentration, subject to the BOD wasteloads 
discharging into the river, meeting a certain pre-set standard, where reliability can be defined as the 
probability of the system performing as desired or better. The Mean-Value First-Order Second-Moment 
(MFOSM) method, a method based on first-order approximations of the Taylor series, is used to estimate 
the reliability. Essentially, the goal is to make some quantitati~.e comparison between the reliability of the 
system before trading, and the reliability after trading. And with that, to gain some insight on the 
suitability of permit trading programs for environmental preservation. 
Following this introduction, Chapter 2.0 gives a review of TDP programs in general as well as a 
discussion of the uncertainties obstructing their successful implementation, Chapter 3.0 outlines the 
theory used, Chapter 4.0 explains the details and methodology of the numerical work done to illustrate 
the ideas developed, Chapter 5.0 presents and discusses the results obtained and finally Chapter 6.0 
summarizes and concludes this study. 
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2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Of late, the trading of environmental permits has been a popular topic of discussion among policy-makers 
and economists, as well as engineers. This section strives to give an overview of the literature that is 
available concerning his subject. Section 2.1 introduces the concept of permit trading with emphasis on 
its tremendous potential as a cost-effective means of pollution control. Section 2.2 reviews three practical 
implementations of permit trading programs to illustrate that such programs do not necessarily work as 
well in practice as they do in theory. And finally Section 2.3 examines why the observations made in 
Section 2.2 are as they are, with the hope of gaining a better understanding of the many uncertainties 
facing permit trading programs that may hinder their success. 
2.1 Discharge Permit Trading Programs 
The notion of discharge permit trading as a pollution control tool was first proposed more than thirty years 
ago by, among others, Dales [1968] and Crocker [1966]. Since then, it has grown from being a mere 
theoretical concept to becoming a reality that is increasingly attracting the attention of economists, 
scientists and legislators. Permit trading is a form of market-based policy that uses economic incentives 
to achieve pollution control, without the high costs normally associated with the more established 
command-and-control regulations. Under permit trading programs, the action to pollute is seen as a 
property right, and is therefore transferable and with tangible value. Participants in a permit trading 
program are each initially allotted an amount of permits, after which they may either buy additional 
permits from, or sell excess permits to, each other. Generally, in an ideal market, the buyers are those 
with relatively high waste abatement costs, while the sellers are those with relatively low waste abatement 
costs. In a trading program, the total number of permits is capped, and this cap is sometimes slowly 
reduced over time depending on the objectives of the program. 
Permits can initially be either sold, or distributed without charge, by the governing authority to the 
dischargers. If the initial permits are to be sold, one method is to auction off the permits. A form of 
auction that discourages bidder collusion and is administratively straightforward is the single-price auction 
[Eheart et al, 1980]. In a single-price auction, each discharger is required to submit a binding schedule 
listing the quantity of permits it is willing to purchase at any given price. All permits are then sold at the 
market clearing price, which is the price at which the aggregate demand of the market equals the total 
amount of permits available. 
However, as pointed out by Eheart et al [1980], a more politically feasible method might be to allocate the 
initial permits without cost to the dischargers, who are then encouraged to re-distribute the permits among 
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themselves via auctions or other means. The initial allocation should be carried out in an equitable 
manner, though equity is sometimes not easily defined. The governing authority also bears the 
responsibility of identifying which parties qualify to receive free permits, and which do not. 
More thorough discussions on alternative methods to initially allocate the permits, and their respective 
advantages and disadvantages, as well as other relevant issues are made by Eheart et al [1980], David 
et al [1980] and Lyon [1982]. 
Naturally, the worth of a permit would depend upon its definition. The most common definition used is 
that that defines a permit as an entitlement to discharge a specified amount of pollutant into the 
environment over a specified period of time. However, there has been suggested variations of that 
original definition, such as that by Eheart and Brill [1983] that defines a permit as the right to deplete the 
quality of the environment at a specific location by a specified amount. And that by Eheart et al [1987] 
that defines a permit as being seasonal, where a permit holder is allowed to discharge at a higher rate 
during times of the year when the assimilative capacity of the environment is larger, but at a lower rate 
during other more critical times. 
The major attraction that permit trading programs offer is that pollution control that is driven by fee 
market forces will, under ideal market conditions, be less costly to society as a whole, than when dictated 
by force of rule, as under command-and-control policies. This is especially so for systems where 
locational effects are negligible i.e. the location of a given discharge does not affect environmental quality. 
For such systems, the permit market equilibrium coincides with the least cost solution [Montgomery, 
1972], where the least cost solution is the combination of waste abatement levels that incurs the least 
amount of cost to attain a particular level of environmental quality. In short, permit trading programs have 
the capability, provided that certain conditions are present, to achieve ambitious environmental goals that 
might be economically unachievable under other policy programs. Practical experience confirms this 
conclusion [Schmalensee et al, 1998;Stavins, 1998; Schwarze & Zapfel, 2000]. 
Permit trading programs have other advantages too. For instance, in relation to other market-based 
policies, permit trading does not place the sometimes excessive financial burden on either the 
dischargers or the governing authority that effluent taxes place on the dischargers, and subsidies on the 
governing authority [Eheart & Brill, 1983]. Furthermore, from an ethical viewpoint, permit trading is likelier 
to win public support than subsidies. Tradable permits, which can be viewed as "licenses to pollute" are 
surely a lesser evil than subsidies that essentially are "bribes not to pollute". Considering also, most 
individuals' natural aversion to any new form of taxes, it is also likely that those in industry would prefer 
permit trading to environmental taxes. Of course, industry would generally pay less overall under trading 
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for waste treatment than under a tax system if the tax rate were set sufficiently high to equal the marginal 
abatement cost. 
Permit trading programs also provide incentive for dischargers to enhance the efficiency of their waste 
abatement facilities [Eheart & Brill, 1983]. By reducing their marginal abatement costs and consequently 
increasing their ability to attain higher degrees of pollution control, dischargers are able to earn credits, 
which they can then sell to other dischargers with higher marginal costs. This gives the net benefit of 
overall cost savings, as well as improved technology. 
Additionally, permit trading programs are better able to safeguard environmental quality in the face of 
industrial growth [Eheart & Brill, 1983]. Those seeking to establish new pollution sources, or expand 
existing ones, may simply purchase permits from other dischargers who are looking to sell their excess 
credits. Since the total number of permits is kept constant, the environment is protected in the sense that 
the total amount of pollution discharged remains the same regardless of the number of sources. This is in 
contrast to command-and-control programs where there is no constraint to ensure that environmental 
quality is maintained each time a newcomer appears, or an existing discharger chooses to increase 
production. Rather, compliance standards under command-and-control programs probably need to be 
revised regularly to accommodate industrial grow1h. 
Finally, permit trading programs have the advantage of being administratively less demanding. Unlike 
command-and-control programs where the regulatory authority holds all governing power, permit trading 
decentralizes the decision-making process and gives more responsibility to the private sector. The 
market is utilized to coordinate decisions such that long-term efficient solutions are evolved [Zerlauth & 
Schubert, 1999]. This removes the need for the governing authority to know and regulate every single 
detail of the problem. After the initial set-up that might require more effort, the regulatory authority can 
withdraw into a more passive role as market watchdog and monitoring agent [Schwarze & Zapfel, 2000], 
whose duties include maintaining a registry of permits to keep track of trades. 
2.2 Practical Implementations of Permit Trading 
Although not the first, the most prominent permit trading program to date is perhaps the Acid Rain S02 
Emissions Trading Program, a national scale program under the administration of the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA). Much literature [Schmalensee et al, 1998; Stavins, 1998] 
has touted the success of this program, which has often times been cited as proof that permit trading 
works not just in theory but in reality too. While it is true that permit trading has demonstrated Is 
immense potential, it is important to realize that not all permit trading programs implemented have 
succeeded and some of those that have, have not behaved as they ideally could have. To illustrate this 
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point, the following sub-sections review three practical implementations of permit trading, the first two 
applied to airshed management and the last to watershed management. 
2.2.1 The Acid Rain 802 Emissions Trading Program 
The Acid Rain 802 Emissions Trading Program was instituted under Title IV of the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990, and is currently still ongoing. This program seeks to reduce the occurrence of acid 
rain by reducing sulfur dioxide (802) emissions from electricity generating units across the continental 
United States. It aims to reduce 802 emissions to roughly half their 1980 levels in the most cost-efficient, 
yet equitable and politically acceptable, fashion possible. 
The 802 Emissions Trading Program is implemented in two phases, Phase I (1995-1999) and Phase II 
(2000-2009). Under Phase I, 263 of the worst polluting large generating units were targeted and their 
aggregate annual emissions capped, while under Phase II, virtually all other generating units are targeted 
as well and their aggregate emissions restricted too. Under his program, each permit allows for the 
emission of one ton of 802 , and is valid for a specific calendar year. Unused permits may be carried 
forward for future use. The total emissions of a plant may not exceed the number of permits it holds. The 
penalty should there be a violation is a fine of US$2000 per ton exceeded, and the forfeiture of an 
equivalent number of tons the following year. 
Observations so far give all indication that the 802 Emissions Trading Program is a success. Short -term 
environmental goals have been met and exceeded. There was a sharp drop in 802 emissions in 1995, 
the f1rst year of the program. Indeed, aggregate emissions in 1995 was about 39% less than the total 
amount of permits issued, and in 1996 about 33% less [Schmalensee et al, 1998]. Annual compliance 
costs have been estimated to be up to US$1 billion less than what they would be under command-and-
control alternatives [Stavins, 1998]. 
Permit prices have also been lower than expected. This can be seen as a positive sign of substantive 
physical and technological advancement. Permit trading could have accelerated the numerous 
innovations in scrubber technology that, together with the deregulation of the railroad industry, have 
driven down the effective marginal cost cf S02 abatement. With transportation costs decreased, util'1ties 
in the East and Midwest now have the option of switching to low-sulfur Western coal from the Powder 
River Basin, when previously they were more or less economically limited to more local high-sulfur coal 
(Conrad & Kohn, 1996; Schmalensee et al, 1998]. Schmalensee et al [1998] estimated the average cost 
to reduce emissions by switching to more expensive low-sulfur coal to be around US$153 per ton, while 
reduction by scrubbing costs around US$265 per ton. 
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Another sign of success is the low transaction costs and increasing trading volume in the S02 permit 
market, which are indications of a well-formed market. Auctions by the Chicago Board of Trade, as well 
as the presence of private brokers such as Fieldston and Cantor Fitzgerald, have helped developed a 
working market where buyers and sellers are able to easily identify each other [Schemalensee et al, 
1998; Solomon, 1999]. According to Zorpette [1994], commissions as low as US$1.75 per permittraded 
have been reported. And according to Schemalensee et al [1998], trading volume in the private market 
has increased from 130,000 in 1993 to 226,000 in 1994 to 1.6 million, 4.9 million and 5.1 million in 1995, 
1996 and 1997 respectively. 
However, the S02 Emissions Trading Program is not entirely without weakness. The lower than expected 
permit prices can be interpreted negatively too. Some [Coggins & Swinton, 1996; Conrad & Kohn, 1996; 
Schwarze & Zapfel, 2000] have argued it to be the result of regulatory overlap. Due to the precedence of 
local regulations that are more stringent, some high cost abaters have been forced to sell their permits at 
prices below their marginal abatement costs. Thus potential buyers become sellers instead. This 
explains cases like that of Wisconsin utilities, which, bounded by state acid rain legislation, were 
significant sellers of Phase I permits. 
Another weakness of the program is the issuance of excess permits above the original cap. This· is said 
to have resulted in lower than anticipated trading volume [Conrad & Kohn, 1996], not to mention 
compromised environmental goals. In 1995, 20% of the 8. 7 million permits in circulation were awarded 
as bonuses to certain utilities for making early emissions reduction efforts, switching to renewable energy 
sources, using advanced clean coal technologies etc. [Schwarze & Zapfel, 2000]. Definitely this 
diminishes the overall efficiency of the program but can be partially justified as necessary to garner 
necessary political support. 
2.2.2 The Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) 
Southern California, especially the South Coast Basin surrounding Los Angeles, had perhaps the worst 
air quality in the country and was the worst non-attainment area where federal md national standards 
were constantly violated, especially for ozone and particulate matter. This is due mainly to its climate and 
geography as well as its above average urban and industrial growth. Whatever environmental progress 
made was sooner or later offset by economic growth. For over 20 years before RECLAIM, costly 
attempts were made to bring the region into compliance via various forms of command-and-control 
regulations. In 1990, the average marginal NO, abatement cost for power plants in Los Angeles was 
about US$25,000 per ton, compared to US$5,000 per ton in the United States [Zerlauth & Schubert, 
1999]. 
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RECLAIM was introduced in 1994, under the jurisdiction of the South Coast Air Quality Management 
District (SCAQMD), and is set to run until 2010. It regulates sulfur oxides (SOx) and nitrogen oxides 
(NOx), which are smog-causing pollutants. RECLAIM does not allow inter-pollutant trading. Its primary 
objective is to reduce the aggregate emissions of NO, by 75%, and SO, by 60% from their 1994 starting 
values but without incurring to high a cost. Unlike the S02 Emissions Trading Program, RECLAIM is a 
multi-industry plan covering dischargers from a wide array of industries including ceramics, food, glass, 
tiles and furniture [Schwarze & Zapfel, 279]. Due to the non-uniform mixing characteristic of the two 
pollutants, RECLAIM divides the region into two trading zones i.e. coastal and inland, with some 
restriction on the direction a trade may take. RECLAIM also does not allow banking, which means that a 
permit is only valid for a specific year and unused permits must be retired. 
Judgment on RECLAIM's performance has been mixed. On one hand, statistics imply it to be a success, 
or at least a partial success. On the other hand, deeper examination shows an under-developed market 
and regulatory uncertainty. 1994 to 1996 statistics from the SCAQMD [1998] show aggregate NOx and 
SOx emissions to be lower than the total amount of permits issued and on the overall, to be following a 
decreasing trend. The SCAQMD [1996] also reported the development of a healthy market with over 400 
trades, or 100,000 tones of pollutants, as of November 1996. Permit prices were also much lower than 
expected [Zerlauth & Schubert, 1999]. 
However, as pointed by Zerlauth and Schubert [1999] and Kiler et al [1997], the lower than expected 
aggregate emissions can be explained by the overallocation of permits, rather than any significant 
decrease in emissions. RECLAIM was launched at a time when California was experiencing a recession, 
which means that many facilities were operating at below-average production levels at that time, and thus 
emitting less than normal. Therefore, the permits were allocated based on emissions data for years when 
the facilities were operating a higher levels, so not to restrict grow1h when the economy recovered. This 
explains the seeming over-compliance, as well as the lower than anticipated permit prices. 
It was also shown that while there has been active trading during the early years of the program, many of 
the trades were "no-price" trades [Kiler et al, 1997]. No-price trades are trades where permits are 
transferred from one facility to another at no cost to the buyer. Though some of these no-price trades 
were legitimate intra-company transactions that resulted in cost savings, others were simply the selling of 
permits to the broker or the return of unsold permits by the broker. No-price trades were also due to the 
dumping of excess permits to non-RECLAIM facilities, and/or non-profit mvironmental groups and such, 
to avoid having to pay unnecessary fees for unused permits and/or for public relation reason~. During the 
first year and a half of the program, permit holders were required to pay fees for permits held, including 
ones that were unused. 
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Furthermore, the major reason cited for the selling of permits is a decrease in production levels resulting 
in a decrease in emissions [Kiler et al, 1997]. This is not surprising considering that California was going 
through a recession during the time when the statistics were compiled. Nonetheless, this does mean that 
emissions were being reduced not because of improvements in control equipment technology or process 
design. This does not necessarily mean program failure, but simply a slower than hoped for start. 
Nevertheless, a good market mechanism has been set up, even in the absence of a central market 
authority [Zerlauth & Schubert, 1999]. Majority of the trades are facilitated by private brokers e.g. Cantor 
Fitzgerald, with transaction costs seen as minimal. An electronic auction program is also available as an 
alternative trading avenue. 
Regulatory uncertainty was also a problem at the program onset, causing market participants to be 
unsure of their long-term planning [Zerlauth & Schubert, 1999; Klier et al, 1997]. Since the 
commencement of the program, the regulations and emissions cap were amended several times. Some 
of these changes were unavoidable due to RECLAIM's experimental nature. For instance, at the 
beginning of the program, permit holders were required to pay fees proportional to the amount of permits 
held, including the ones that are unused. However, when it was realized that this requirement caused 
price fluctuations towards the end of the compliance cycle, this requirement was revised so that permit 
holders now have to pay fees proportional only to the amount of permits actually used. 
2.2.3 The Fox River Trading Program in Wisconsin 
The Fox River effluent trading program was launched in 1981, under the authority of the Wisconsin 
Department of Natural Resources (DNR), and is, at this time, still ongoing. It is the first water quality 
trading program implemented and perhaps the most well-known to date. II regulates the discharge of 
Biological Oxygen cemand (BOD) from roughly twenty industrial and municipal facilities along the Fox 
River in Wisconsin, which is tributary to Green Bay. Most of the industrial facilities are pulp and paper 
mills, and municipal facilities wastewater treatment plants. The Fox River program is an offset program 
that primarily seeks to maintain water quality amidst economic growth. The cap on the total allowable 
amount of BOD discharge is fixed, unlike the more high-profile airshed trading programs where the cap is 
reduced over time. According to EPA [1996] and Hahn and Hester [1989], a preliminary analysis, carried 
out in 1979, estimated annual savings of up to US$6.8 million. 
Since its inception, only two trades have taken place. The first trade transferred permits from a pulp and 
paper mill to a municipal wastewater treatment plant [EPA, 1996]. The mill had shut down its wastewater 
treatment plant, and re-directed its waste to be treated at the municipal plant. The trade was to adjust for 
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this new arrangement. As for the second trade, permits were transferred from a pulp and paper mill to a 
newly built marina [Jarvie & Solomon, 1998]. 
This lack of trading volume is probably due to the program's many regulatory restrictions [Hahn & Hester, 
1989; EPA, 1996; Woodward et al, 2002]. Trades have to meet the approval of the governing authority 
before being allowed to take place, and are only allowed under certain conditions such as e.g. the buyer 
must be a new facility, or an expanding one, or unable to meet discharge limits even when using required 
technology. Trades that have the sole objective of saving costs are barred. Each potential trade has to 
pass a review process that could take up to six months, and is only passed if tests show that the 
redistribution of waste-loads does not cause water quality standards to be violated. 
There is also no effective market mechanism in place. Whatever trade that is to take place would be 
through bilateral negotiations, a process that is time-consuming as well as costly. Effort has to be spent 
to search for and locate potential trading partners. Furthermore, since whatever savings that could come 
from trading would be only a very small percentage of the total cost of operation, especially for the pulp 
and paper mills, there is little motivation for the facilities to spend that extra effort to trade [EPA, 1996]. 
Nevertheless, considering that the primary goal of the program is not to promote savings but to protect 
the river's water quality [Hahn & Hester, 1989; EPA, 1996], the program cannot be said to be without 
success. The program has played, and is still playing, its role by effectively capping the BOD wasteloads 
entering the river. Furthermore, the program is among the first of such to be implemented and thus, the 
lessons learnt from it are invaluable. 
2.3 Uncertainties Facing Permit Trading Programs 
The uncertainties confronting permit trading programs are countless and are responsible for them not 
performing as well in practice as in theory. The adequate understanding of these uncertainties is 
imperative for the design of trading programs that are robust and cost effective but yet not disregarding 
environmental quality and the interests of minority stakeholders. 
One major source of uncertainty is the complex makeup of the environment, complicated by its stochastic 
nature. Modeling difficulties arise from the lack of accurate understanding of natural environmental 
processes, and from imperfect measurement techniques of ever-changing environmental variables. 
Environmental models are mathematical simplifications that make too many assumptions, and thus are 
never perfect. In a permit trading program, it is important to be able to predict beforehand how trading 
might impact environment quality, and hence the need for reliable environmental models. 
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Another source of uncertainty is the unpredictability of human behavior that makes it difficult to reliably 
foretell market performance. The cost effectiveness of TDP programs is only wholly realized when the 
market functions as envisioned, i.e. when there is active trading between the program participants. 
Should participating firms decide not to trade, a TDP program is then only as cost effective as a uniform 
discharge program, or whatever program that forms the basis for the initial allocation of permits. Market 
imperfection not only causes loss of cost savings, but also makes it difficult to know in advance how 
permits in a market will move, and thus, how trading might infiuence environmental quality. In theory 
[Eheart, 1980; Brill et al, 1984; Eheart et al, 1987] perfect market conditions are assumed where firms will 
act to maximize profits, transaction costs are absent, and information is freely available. However, in 
reality, such market conditions hardly ever exist [Atkinson & Tietenberg, 1991; Stavins, 1995]. 
Market unpredictability may also be due to the banking of emissions credits. Where banking is allowed, 
as it is under the EPA 802 Emissions Trading Program, some firms might choose to retain their excess 
permits for future use instead of selling them. This is primarily due to their fear that they might not be 
able to purchase them back in the future if need be, and this in turn is due to uncertainty of future permit 
prices and of possible regulatory tightening. Market unpredictability is further increased when firms 
choose to trade internally even when it is more profitable to trade ex1ernally. Internal trades, or rather 
intra-firm trades, are favored when there is no organized market institution, when ex1ernal trades require 
regulatory approval, and when the property rights associated with a permit are not clearly defined [Hahn 
& Noll, 1990]. 
Political considerations too are important factors in the successful implementation of permit trading 
programs [Hahn & Noll, 1990; Stavins, 1998]. It is worth bearing in mind that at the end of the day, it is 
the politicians and bureaucrats who make the final decision as to whether or not a new program being 
implemented is permit-based. A successful policy is one that balances the objectives of politics with the 
objectives of economics. A good understanding of the confiicting objectives of the many stakeholders 
involved is necessary to pave the way for a wider acceptance of permit trading programs. 
Of course, these uncertainties thwarting the successful implementation of permit trading programs are too 
many to address all at once. For this study, attention is therefore focused only on the issues that are 
deemed more tangible and less abstract, namely the modeling uncertainties associated with the 
stochastic environment, of which more details are given in the following sub-section. To lay the 
groundwork for future work, further discussion on the presence of transaction costs in permit markets is 
also made. 
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2.3.1 Environmental-Modeling Difficulties 
The environment is a complex system that is unfortunately too large and too open to model adequately 
without difficulty. For modeling purposes, it is usually convenient and many times necessary, to 
compress environmental behavior into a few parameters .and mathematical equations. However, doing 
so forces assumptions that may not be entirely valid. Errors resulting from such invalid assumptions are 
sometimes known as Type I errors, as defined by Burges and Lettenmaier [1975]. 
Nevertheless, assuming that numerical models are adequately able to represent the environment, there 
will still be errors due to the non-existence of foolproof measuring techniques of variables, such as stream 
fiow, rainfall and concentration. While some parameters like temperature are fairly easily to measure 
accurately, other parameters like BOD decay coefficients are not as easily so. The stochastic nature of 
the environment makes this problem worse. Errors stemming from the use of inaccurate parameter 
values are sometimes known as Type II errors, again as defined by Burges and Lettenmaier [1975]. 
In permit trading programs, permits will move from one location to another. The movements of these 
permits, together with the natural fuctuations of the environment, make it very possible for trading to 
cause environmental degradation. This is especially so for systems where locational effects are 
significant i.e. environmental quality is strongly infiuenced by the location of a given discharge. 
Therefore, it is desirable to be able to anticipate fairly accurately a priori how trading might impact 
environmental quality. To do so, numerical representations of the environment are utilized and hence, it 
is crucial that whatever errors that might arise from unreliable models and imprecise data are kept 
minimal. 
This issue of the potential impact of trading on environmental quality has many times been addressed by 
such as Eheart [1980] and Brill et al [1984]. These earlier studies employed deterministic models that 
assumed an unchanging environment. While this approach is computationally advantageous, it is not 
without fiaw. Though these studies have been invaluable in laying essential groundwork, a more 
thorough approach would be to use stochastic models that do not neglect the ever-changing state of the 
environment. Numerous methods to incorporate stochastic uncertainty into multi-objective models have 
been suggested in literature. Included are ones based on first-order approximations of the Taylor series, 
of which one of them, the Mean-Value First-Order Second-Moment (MFOSM) method, provides 
foundation for parts of this study. 
Another example of first-order methods is the Advanced First-Order Second-Moment (AFOSM) method. 
In general, the principal advantage these methods have to offer is their computational simplicity and 
accessibility. However, this advantage is somewhat diminished by their lesser versatility. First-order 
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methods assume the output variable to be a linear function of the input variable(s), an assumption that 
will not hold for strongly non-linear systems. Furthermore, when using first-order methods, the probability 
distributions of the random input and output variables are represented only by their means and variances. 
This leads to the inability of these methods to accurately represent highly skewed distributions. A more 
thorough discussion on the pros and cons of first-order methods, as well as an overview of their 
underlying theory can be found in Kataoka [1963], Yen et al [1986] and Ang and Tang [1984], 
One example of first-order methods applied to water resources management is by Tung [1990], who 
compared MFOSM and AFOSM and found them both to generally give good agreement with Monte Carlo 
simulation results. However, for extreme probabilities, MFOSM was found to be less reliable, and the 
AFOSM method superior. Melching and Anmangandla [1992] made a similar comparison and obtained 
results that confirmed Tung's [1990] findings. More recently, Vasquez et al [2000] used AFOSM coupled 
with genetic algorithms to optimize the waste-load allocations of a river system. Also, recent work by 
Maier et al [2001] extended the usefulness of AFOSM from just reliability estimation to estimations of 
vulnerability and resilience as well. AFOSM has also been used for the sensitivity analysis of complex 
water quality models, and has shown to be more effective than the traditional method of perturbing one 
variable at a time [Melching & Yoon, 1996; Melching & Bauwens, 2001]. 
Further methods of solving stochastic multi-objective systems are those based on Monte Carlo simulation 
[Meyer et al, 1994; Storck et al, 1997] and others based on multiple system realizations [Morgan, 1993; 
Ritzel, 1994; Takyi & Lence, 1999]. There is aso the Second-Order Reliability Method (SORM) [Madsen 
et al, 1986]. For more details on the analysis of uncertainty and risk in water quality modeling, refer to 
Beck [1987], and in policy-making, refer to Morgan and Henrion [1990]. 
To the best of this author's knowledge, the concepts and methods mentioned above, have not, before this 
study, been applied directly within the context of permit trading. Nevertheless it has been acknowledged 
that varying environmental conditions do affect the efficiency of a trading program and that to design a 
program based on a single worst-case period forces dischargers to treat at levels higher than necessary 
during other times. To reduce this inefficiency, O'Neil [1983] proposed the use of a time-varying permit 
plan, whereby a year is divided into a number of periods according to local weather conditions. Within 
each period, environmental parameters like temperature and stream flow are assumed constant. 
However, they may change from one period to the next. Under such a plan, permits are dated such that 
dischargers are allowed to abate less during non-critical periods. Eheart et al [1987] further examined 
this idea and confirmed that time-varying permits are indeed more cost effective than the conventional 
invariant ones. 
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2.3.2 Transaction Costs in Permit Markets 
Much has been said in literature regarding the role of transaction costs in TDP markets [Stavins, 1995; 
Solomon, 1999; Montero, 1997]. There seems not to be any exact definition of transaction costs. 
Loosely, it may be taken to mean the secondary costs of trading that are not directly related to the buying 
and selling of permits. This includes, but is certainly not limited to, the cost of gathering information, the 
cost of searching for potential trading partners, the cost of negotiating new contracts, the cost of 
brokerage commissions/fees and the cost of modifying existing engineering systems to meet new 
abatement targets. 
Many of the earlier works on permit trading [Montgomery, 1972; Brill et al, 1984; Eheart et al, 1987] 
ignored transaction costs and assumed perfect market conditions, resulting in overestimations of the cost 
efficiency of trading, and underestimations of the possibility of market failure. Transaction costs that are 
too high make it unprofitable for potential buyers or sellers to trade. Even though their marginal 
abatement costs might be such that trading is an attractive option, the presence of transaction costs 
might force the overall cost of trading to exceed their original costs of compliance. 
One sign of the presence of unhealthily high transaction costs in a permit market is trading volume that is 
relatively weak. For example, transaction costs may be blamed for the failure of the Fox River TDP 
program. Due to its many regulatory restrictions that require those interested in trading to endure a 
lengthy approval process, its entire trading history, as noted above, so far contains only two trades [EPA, 
1996; Jarvie & Solomon, 1998; Hahn & Hester, 1989]. On the other hand, the success of EPA's S02 
Emissions Trading Program, can be partially attributed to a well-formed market where transaction costs 
are minimal. Regular auctions held by the Chicago Board of Trade, as well as the establishment of 
private brokers, have ensured the formation of a straightforward trading procedure with little uncertainty 
[Schemalensee et al, 1998; Solomon, 1999]. 
A much-cited piece of literature on transaction costs is that by Stavins [1995], who outlined theoretically 
how transaction costs might negatively affect market equilibrium, causing the cost-efficiency of a trading 
program to decline. He also proved that, in the presence of transaction costs, the initial distribution of 
permits does determine the final equilibrium point. Stavins' [1995] model is a basic one with two market 
participants, both having idealized twice-differentiable cost curves. This work by Stavins [1995] is 
noteworthy as it is perhaps the first to provide some theoretical foundation to the problem. 
Montero [1997] extended Stavins' [1995] model to include trade uncertainty i.e. the uncertainty of a 
potential trade gaining regulatory approval when such approval is required. For cases where trade 
uncertainty is an issue, trading decisions are made based on the expected cost of compliance, rather 
than its deterministic equivalent. Montero [1997] also demonstrated how numerical modeling might be 
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used for more complex cases where there are multiple participants, with discontinuous cost curves and/or 
the discrete waste abatement variables. 
Gangadharan [2000] offers an alternative approach to looking at the problem. Using RECLAIM as a case 
study, he investigated the effect of transaction costs on the behavior of polluters in terms of their trading 
probabilities. It was shown that transaction costs do indeed reduce the probability of trading. 
Gangadharan's [2000] model considers not just the estimated costs of compliance, but also the locations 
of polluters, the initial permit allocation and the potential for industrial growth. 
The above-mentioned articles have definitely contributed greatly to the better understanding of the effects 
of transaction costs on permit trading. 
perspective that judges the presence of 
However, these articles were written from an economic 
transaction costs to be undesirable as it reduces market 
efficiency. No effort has been made thus far to evaluate how this reduction in market efficiency might 
affect environmental performance, either positively or negatively. 
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3.0THEORY 
The Mean-Value First-Order Second-Moment (MFOSM) method [Kataoka, 1963; Ang and Tang, 1984; 
Yen et al, 1986] is a method often used to estimate a system's uncertainty and is essentially based on 
first-order approximations of the Taylor series. Mathematically it is relatively straightforward. It is also 
computationally simpler than some of the other uncertainty analysis methods proposed in literature 
[Morgan, 1993; Madsen et al, 1986; Vasquez et al, 2000; Maier et al, 2001]. Though unsuitable for highly 
non-linear systems, it more than suffices for the purposes of this study. The following sub-sections 
describe how MFOSM may be applied to water quality modeling, and how it may be further expanded to 
show the effects of trading on the water quality reliability of a river. 
3.1 MFOSM Applied to Water Quality Modeling 
MFOSM has been widely applied to water quality modeling by among many others, Tung [1990] and 
Melching and Anmangandla [1992]. MFOSM is based on first-order approximations of the Taylor series, 
which for a general multivariate function,Jtakes the following form. 
f(X)=J(X')+f(x,-x;)'(atJ +f(x,-x;)'(a'(J + ............. (1) 
1=1 1! ax, X' i=I 2! ax, X' 
where x1 is the i'h input variable, xt' is x1 evaluated at the expansion point e, X is the x1 vector, X' is the x1 
vector evaluated at the expansion point e and n is the total number of input variables. Like other first-
order methods, MFOSM truncates the Taylor series after the first-order term. Therefore, by expanding 
the function about the mean values of the uncertain elements within the system, MFOSM reduces 
equation (1) above to give 
J(X)= J(Xm )+ ~(x1 -x~{: L .......... (2) 
where X"' is the x1 vector evaluated at its mean. From equation (2), it can be derived the function's 
expected mean and variance to be 
E[J(X)] = t(xm) .......... (3) 
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var[J(X)] ~ ~t,[!, LU~ L cov(x,xJ .......... (4) 
Consider now the linear water quality model below. Equation (5) gives the dissolved oxygen (DO) 
concentration at a particular point j along a river. 
I 
J(X)=D01 =B1 +LW:au .......... (5) 
where D01 is the DO concentration at point J along the river, W, is the Biochemical Oxygen Demand 
(BOD) discharge rate of discharger i, 81 is the DO concentration when W, is zero, au is a negative 
coefficient relating W, to the loss of DO concentration at point j and I is the total number of dischargers 
along the river. In this study, B1 and au are assumed as stochastic but W, as deterministic. 
Applying MFOSM to the water quality model by substituting equation (5) into equations (3) and (4) gives 
I 
DO; =B; + LW:a; .......... (6) 
I I I 
var[Do1]= LL w;w, cov(a,1.a,J+ 2 LW1 cov(auBJ+var(sJ .......... (7) 
i=l 
where h is a general counting index, DO/ is the D01 mean, B/ is the B1 mean and aum is the au mean. The 
system's uncertainty can thus be expressed in terms of a reliability index dependent on the DO mean and 
variance. Let {31 be that index for a particular location j. 
DO~~ -DO~'d {31 = J J 
Uno ) 
.......... (8) 
I I I LLW,W, cov(au,a,1 )+ 2LW1 cov(au,BJ+ var(B1 ) 
~Ih~ i~ 
where DO/'d is the pre-set DO concentration standard to be maintained at point j and a001 is the D01 
standard deviation. By assuming that the central limit theorem applies so that D01 is normally distributed, 
an assumption that is justified f I is sufficiently large, the reliability of the DO concentration meeting a 
certain pre-set standard at a location j can be found as 
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reliability= P(Do1 - Do;'d;:: o) = ¢(/3 J .......... (9) 
where if{f3j) is a function that returns the standardized normal cumulative distribution for a specified value 
of fJJ. The greater is {31, the higher is the reliability of the system. Positive values of {31 give reliabilities 
greater than 50% while negative values of {31 give reliabilities smaller than 50%. 
3.2 MFOSM Applied to Permit Trading 
When trading takes place, the discharge locations corresponding to the permits being traded are 
changed. For systems where locational effects are non-negligible, this modifies a location's {31 value and 
hence, its reliability. Generally, that change in f3J can be expressed as 
.......... (10) 
where the subscript old represents the system at its original state before trading, and the subscript new 
the changed state of the system after trading. Therefore, f3J.old is location j's reliability index before 
trading, and fJJ."'w is location j's reliability index after trading. From equation (1 0), it can be deduced that 
any change in DO reliability due to trading wuld be dependent on the change in the mean, as well as 
that in the standard deviation, of the DO distribution. The desired DO standard to be achieved is also a 
contributing factor. An increase in the mean DO tends to be favorable as it leads to an overall increase in 
the reliability, but a corresponding increase in the standard deviation could override that increase in the 
mean, resulting in a worse reliability. 
For a clearer idea of how the DO mean and standard deviation might change to produce an overall 
increase in reliability, equation (1 0) can be re-written as 




Note that equation (12) defines 
lDom - DO"d j 
r J lnew 
; I,; = [Dam - DO''d] 
1 1 old 
and 
Equation (11) above applies to cases where f3J.old is non-zero. For such cases, it can thus be observed 
that it is the F1 ratio, not the absolute increase or decrease in the DO mean and/or standard deviation, that 
determines whether or not a given change in the system produces a positive change in the reliability. 
When f3Jold is negative, which is the case when [DO/-DO/'dlold is negative, only F1 values that are less 
than unity will yield an increase in the reliability. Conversely, when /3i.old is positive, which is the case 
when [DO/-DO/'dlold is positive, only 0 values that are greater than unity will yield an increase in the 
reliability. When 0 is exactly one, the reliability remains as before, even though the DO mean and 
standard deviation might have changed. 
For cases where f3Jold is zero, equation (1 0) reduces to simply 
[
DO" - DO''d] 11/3 j = f3 ),new = 1 - 1 when 
(J" DO 
1 new 
f3 },old = Q .......... (14) 
{31,1d is zero when [DO/ -DO/'dl old equals zero. When this is true, the initial reliability is exactly 50%, and 
the initial DO standard deviation becomes irrelevant. Whether a given change to the system will produce 
a positive or negative !!.{31 depends only on [DO/ -DO/'dl "'w· A positive [DO/ -DO/'dl "'w is desirable as it 
produces a positive !!.{31 . The new a001 comes into play only when calculating for the extent to which the 
reliability increases or decreases. It is advantageous for the new a001 to be large when [D01 m -DO/'dl "'w is 
negative, but small when [DO/ -DO/'dl "'w is positive. 
For further illustration of the principles introduced above, consider the following three scenarios. 
I. [DO/-DO/'dlo1dis positive and therefore /3i.old is positive. 
II. [DO/-DO/'dl old is negative and therefore /3i,old is negative. 
Ill. [DO/ -DO/'dl old is zero and therefore /3i,old is zero. 
Scenario I: When [DO/ -DO/'dl old and hence, {31,1d are positive, according to equation ( 11 ), a F1 ratio that is 
greater than one is required if it is desired an increase in the reliability. Such a value of F1 will be 
achieved if and only if jj1 is greater than fiJ· The general idea is that an increase in the mean, though 
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encouraging, will not lead to an overall increase in the reliability if there is a too-large increase in the 
standard deviation. A too-large increase in the standard deviation will offset whatever improvement in the 
reliability due to the increased mean. Refer to Figure 1 below for a graphical illustration of this notion. 
Similarly, a reduced mean, though discouraging, is not necessarily harmful if its negative effects are 
compensated by the positive effects of a sufficiently reduced standard deviation. Refer to Figure 2 below. 
Furthermore, fi.J must always be positive (i.e. the DO mean must always be greater than the DO standard) 
for there to be any improvement in the reliability. Due to fiJ being inherently ;nsitive, a negative fiJ will 
give a negative !-.f3J regardless of whatfiJ may be. 
pdf before trading 
pdf after trading 
DO concentration, DO J 
Figure 1: One possible effect of trading on the DO 
distribution when {3M" is positive. Although there is 
an increase in the mean (ffp1 ), due to an increase 
in the standard deviation (f,J>1) such thatfiJ> j,J, 
there is an overall decrease in the reliability. Fj is 
greater than zero but less than one. 
pdf after trading 
/ 
pdf before trading 
DO concentration, DO J 
Figure 2: One possible effect of trading on the DO 
distribution when {3M" is positive. Although there is 
a decrease in the mean (O<fiJ<1 ), due to a 
decrease in the standard deviation (f,J<1) such that 
fiJ> fiJ, there is an overall increase in the reliability. 
Fj is greater than one. 
Scenario II: When [DOJ m -DO/'dl , 1d and hence, f3J.old are negative, it is only when FJ is less than one that an 
increase in the reliability is possible. For Fj to be less than one, fiJ must be greater than fi.J• which can be 
either positive or negative. A positive j,J that is greater than unity means a deterioration in the mean DO. 
When j,J is positive, a negative !JfJJ may be avoided if the deterioration in the mean is accompanied by an 
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increase in the standard deviation to a new value that is at least fiJ times the original value. Refer to 
Figure 3 below. On the other hand, fiJ ratios that are less than unity, including those in the negative 
range, indicate an improvement in the mean. Generally, this leads to a healthier reliability. However, for 
cases where fiJ is non-negative, but still less than unity, should this increase in the mean be followed by a 
decrease in the standard deviation such that fiJ becomes smaller than fiJ, then the good effects cf the 
improved mean is cancelled, and sometimes even surpassed, by the unpleasant effects of the narrowed 
standard deviation. Refer to Figure 4 below. 
Scenario Ill: When [DO/-DO/'dlotd and f1i,,1d are zero, the original reliability before trading is El<actly 50% 
irrespective of the standard deviation. The only requirement for a better after-trading reliability is an 
increased mean DO such that the new D01 m is greater than DO/'d As for the standard deviation, there is 
no specific constraint on it as long as there is an increase in the mean. When this is the case, the 
reliability will be greater than 50% no matter the standard deviation, though a reduced standard deviation 
is favored. Refer to Figure 5 below. On the contrary, when the mean is decreased to less than DO/'d, the 
reliability will be less than 50%. For such cases, an increased standard deviation is favored. Refer to 
Figure 6 below. An unchanged mean means an unchanged reliability regardless of how the standard 
deviation might change. Refer to Figure 7 below. 
pdf before trading ~ 
pdf after trading 
\ 
DO concentration, DO 1 
Figure 3: One possible effect of trading on the DO 
distribution when {3M" is negative. Although there 
is a decrease in the mean (fj1>1 ), due to an 
increase in the standard deviation (/21>1) such that 
fiJ> fiJ, there is an overall increase in the reliability. 
F) is less than one. 
DOJ''" 
pdf after trading ~ 
pdf before trading 
\ 
DO concentration, DO 1 
Figure 4: One possible effect of trading on the DO 
distribution when {31,,1d is negative. Although there 
is an increase in the mean (//J<1 ), due to a 
decrease in the standard deviation (i.i1<1) such that 
jjJ> hJ. there is an overall decrease in the 
reliability. Fj is greater than one. 
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DO/" DO/" 
pdf after trading 
./ 
pdf before trading 
pdf before trading pdf after trading 
\ 
DO concentration, D01 DO concentration, DO 1 
Figure 5: One possible effect of trading on the DO 
distribution when f3M1d is zero. A decreased 
standard deviation is favorable when there is an 
increased mean. On the overall, there is an 
increase in the reliability. 
Figure 6: One possible effect of trading on the DO 
distribution when f3j.ald is zero. An increased 
standard deviation is favorable when there is a 
decreased mean. On the overall, there is a 
decrease in the reliability. 
D0/11 
pdfaflertrading 
~ pdf before trading 
DO concentration, DO 1 
Figure 7: One possible effect of trading on the DO 
distribution when f3j.old is zero. The standard is irrelevant 
when the mean is unchanged. Regardless the standard 
deviation, the reliability remains exactly 50% when there 
is no change to the mean. 
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Since the DO reliability directly relies on its mean and standard deviation, the more fundamental question 
is what are the factors, within the permit trading context, affecting the mean and standard deviation. For 
a river system, if defining T; as the net amount of permits traded by discharger i, equations (6) and (7) can 
be re-written to give 
ND 
Do;,w = B7 + L (w,,,,d + T; )a; .......... (15) 
ND ND 
var(Doj,,J= LL (w,,,,d + T; Xw,,,,d + T, )cov(au,aki) 
i=I k=l 
ND 
+ 2 L (W;,,1d + T; )cov(au,Bj )+var(Bj) .......... (16) 
i=l 
DIY"i"'w is the new mean DO concentration at point j after trading, var(DOj.,ew) is the new DO variance at 
point J after trading and Wi.old is discharger i's original discharge rate before trading. r, can be either 
positive or negative. T; is positive when there is a net buying of permits by discharger i, and negative 
when there is a net selling of permits by discharger i. Since the total amount of permits is fixed, the net 
sum of all permits traded must be zero. 
ND LT, =0 .......... (17) 
i=I 
From equations (15) and (16), it can be seen that the DO mean and standard deviation are functions of 
the B1 and au distributions, as well as the sign and quantity of T;. The Bj and au distributions in turn, are 
subject to local weather ftuctuations and other similar factors, while r, is constrained by economic 
considerations. For further illustration, for a two-discharger system where T1 ~-T2 . equation (15) can be 
rearranged to give 
where tillO/ is the effect of trading on the DO mean concentration at point), and DIY"j.old is the original 
DO mean at point j before trading. Equation (18) indicates that a trade that transfers permits from a 
source with a greater negative mean au to another with a smaller negative mean au brings about an 
improved DO mean. Refer to Figure 8 below. Figure 8 shows the tillO/ ~ 0 line, which overlies the aljrn = 
a2/ line. When T1 is positive, i.e., when there is a net transfer of permits from discharger 2 to discharger 
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1, any combination of aljm and a2/ that falls above the MJO/~O line will cause an increase in the DO 
mean, and vice versa. The DO mean is independent of trading for am 11 - am 21 combinations that fall on the 
MJ0/~0 line. The farther a system's am 1 1 -am 21 combination is from the MJ0/~0 line, the more sensitive is 




Figure 8: The MJOt~o line for a two-discharger 
river system. The MJOj'~O line is independent 
of Wi,oiJ, Ti and the Bj distribution. It overlies the 
x~y line. 
var(a2j) 
Figure 9: The ,;var(DO)~O line for a two-
discharger river system for a given 
combination of w,,," and var(Bl The 
,;var(D01)~0 line changes with T1• Note that 
O<a<b<c. 
In much the same way as equation (15) can be re-written to give equation (18), equation (16) can be re-
written to give 
1'1 var(D01 ) = var(D01,,J- var(D01,,1d) =I;' {var(a11 )-
2 cov(a11 , a,J+ var(a,J}+ 21; {W';,,1d var(alJ )+ (w,,,1d- ff';,,Id )cov(a11 , a,J-
w,,,,d var(a,1 )+ cov(a11 ,BJ- cov(a,1 ,B;)} .......... (19) 
where ,;var(DO;) represents the effect of trading on the DO variance/standard deviation, while var(DOJ,old) 
is the original DO variance at point J before trading. Equation (19) indicates that generally, there will be 
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an increase in the DO variance whenever there is a transfer of permits from a source with a smaller a1j 
variance to another with a greater a1j variance. However, this is not always the case. The opposite may 
be true depending on Wi.old· which represents the initial allocation of permits, and T1. !1var(DO;) is also 
affected by the Bj distribution. Refer to Figure 9 above, which gives the !1var(D0j}=O line and 
demonstrates how it changes as T1 changes when all other factors are kept constant. For a given 
(positive) value of T, var(a 1j)-var(a2;) combinations that fall above its corresponding !1var(DOj)=O line will 
cause var(DOj) to be increase. In the same way, var(a!j)-var(a2;) combinations that fall below the 
corresponding !1var(DOj)~O line will cause var(DOj) to decrease, and those that fall exactly on the 
corresponding t;.var(DOj)=O will render the system insensitive to trading. Systems with var(a!j)-var(a2j) 
combinations that lie farther from the !1var(DO;)~O line tend to be more vulnerable to trading than others 
with var(a!j)-var(a2j) combinations that lie nearer to the !1var(DOj)=O line. Note that the !1var(DOj)=O line 
does not overlap the var(a 1;)~var(a2;) line. 
3.3 A Hypothetical Example of a River System with Two Dischargers 
For some numerical confirmation of the ideas developed in the previous sub-sections, consider a 
hypothetical example of permit trading applied to a stochastic river system with two dischargers. First 
consider a scenario where W1.,1d = 5 [MIT], W2,,1d = 4 [MiT], am,j = -0.2 [(M/L3) I (MIT)], am 2j = -0.4 [M/L3 per 
MIT], Bmj = 8.0 [M/L'J, var(atj) = 0.025 [(M/L3) I (MIT)] 2, var(a2;) = 0.04 [(M/L3) I (MIT)] 2, var(B;) = 0.02 
32 3 2 2 6 [MiL] , cov(a!j,a 2;) = 0.013 [(MiL) I (MIT)] , cov(atj.B;) = 0.009 [(M /L) I (MIT)] and cov(a!j.Bj) = 0.011 
[(M 2/L6 ) I (MIT)]. This scenario corresponds to Scenario I as defined in the previous sub-section where for 
a DO/'d value of 5 [M/L'J, f3otd is positive. 
Consider also a second scenario where W1,,1d = 5 [MiT], W2,,1d = 4 [M/T], am 1j = -0.30 [(M/L3) I (MiT)], am2j =-
0.35 [(M/L3) I (MIT)], smj = 7.0 [M/L3], var(a!j) = 0.01 [(M/L3) I (MIT)] 2, var(a2j) = 0.10 [(M/L3) I (MIT)] 2 , 
32 3 2 2 6 
var(B;) = 0.02 [MiL] , cov(a!j,a 2;) = 0.013 [(M/L) I (MIT)] , cov(a1iB;) = 0.006 [(M /L) I (MIT)] and 
cov(a 1iB;) = 0.018 [(M2/L6) I (MIT)]. This scenario corresponds b Scenario II as defined in the previous 
sub-section where for a DO/'d value of 5 [MiL\ f3, 1d is negative. 
For both scenarios, refer to Table 1 below for the initial DO mean, standard deviation and reliability before 
any trading is allowed. Refer also the Figures 10 to 13 to observe how trading might affect the DO mean, 
standard deviation and reliability. The figures were plotted based on equations (8), (9), (14) and (15). 
For additional exemplification, four sub-scenarios were defined. Sub-Scenario A is defined as when T1 = -
4 [MIT], Sub-Scenario B as when T1 = -2 [MIT], Sub-Scenario C as when T1 = 2 [MiT] and Sub-Scenario D 
as when T1 = 4 [MiT]. Recall that when T1 is negative, as in the cases of Sub-Scenarios A and B, there is 
a net transfer of permits from discharger 1 to discharger 2. And when T1 is positive, as in the cases of 
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Sub-Scenarios C and D, there is a net transfer of permits from discharger 2 to discharger 1. For each of 
the two scenarios and each of the four sub-scenarios, i!./31 was calculated. The fiJ, hJ and F1 ratios (refer 
to equations (12) and (13)) were also determined to verify the concepts proposed in the previous sub-
section. Refer to Table 2 below. Moreover, the t\var(DOj)""O and i!.DOt""o lines were drawn to give further 
insight to the problem. Refer to Figures 14 and 15. 
Table 1: The initial DO mean, standard deviation and reliability (T1 = 0) for Scenarios I and II. 
Scenario I (~j.old > 0) II (~i.old < 0) 
~j.old [-] 0.285 -0.561 
DOj,old [MIL 1 5.400 4.100 
O'ooj,old [MIL 1 1.404 1.605 
Table 2: Effect of trading on the DO mean, standard deviation and reliability for Sub-Scenarios A to D. 
Sub-Scenario I-A 1-B 1-C 1-D II-A 11-B 11-C 11-D 
T, [Mfl] -4.00 -2.00 2.00 4.00 -4.00 -2.00 2.00 4.00 
~~j [-] -0.516 -0.285 0.291 0.523 0.143 0.085 -0.112 -0.164 
mor [MIL 1 -0.800 -0.400 0.400 0.800 -0.200 -0.100 0.100 0.200 
~O"ooj [MIL 1 0.330 0.122 -0.015 0.081 1.028 0.496 -0.415 -0.640 
f,j [-] -1.000 0.000 2.000 3.000 1222 1.111 0.889 0.778 
f,j 1-1 1.235 1.087 0.989 1.058 1.640 1.309 0.741 0.601 
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The results presented in Table 2 illustrate the idea proposed in the previous sub-section of how the effect 
of trading on environmental reliability might be described in terms of certain ratios, namely the fiJ, hJ and 
FJ ratios. And of how these ratios are able to give a good understanding of how trading-induced changes 
in the DO mean and/or standard deviation might rnuse the DO reliability to either increase for the better 
or decrease for the worse. 
Consider first the case where /3i.old is greater than zero, which is the case of Scenario I and its four sub-
scenarios, lA to m. The numbers in Table 2 validate equation (11) that prescribes that for a positive 
f3i.old value, a f0 ratio that is greater than unity is required for an increased reliability. Sub-Scenarios fA 
and IB have f0 ratios less than one with negative changes to their reliabilities; while Sub-Scenarios fC 
and 1-D have f0 ratios greater than one with positive changes to their reliabilities. Furthermore, the 
system specifications are such that the reliability is a stronger function of the mean, than it is of the 
standard deviation. Since the standard deviation does not change significantly with trading, an increased 
mean tends to bring about an increased reliability, and vice versa. Take for example Sub-Scenario fD 
where there is an increase in the mean YiJ>1) that helps the reliability. However, at the same time, there 
is also an increase in the standard deviation f2J>1) that inhibits the reliability. Since fiJ is greater than j,J, 
which means that the positive effects of the increased mean outweighs the negative effects of the 
increased standard deviation, there is an overall increase in the reliability (Fp1 ). Take also the example 
of Sub-Scenario fA where trading has caused the mean to fall to below DO/'d (ljJ<O) and by that alone, 
the reliability to drop (FJ<0<1). This is regardless of the changes to the standard deviation, which 
incidentally, has increased. However, the increase in the standard deviation ..GJ>1) does mitigate the 
negative effects of the decreased mean, even though it is unable to fully offset them. 
Consider now he case where /3j.old is smaller than zero, which is the case of Scenario II and its four sub-
scenarios, II-A to 11-D. For this scenario, FJ ratios smaller than unity are desired, as they bring about 
better reliabilities (equation (11 )). Again, the results in Table 1 confirm this. Sub-Scenarios II-A and 11-B 
have FJ ratios that are less than one, and reliabilities that are improved by trading. On the other hand, 
Sub-Scenarios 11-C and 11-D have FJ ratios that are greater than one, but reliabilities that are made worse 
by trading. Unlike Scenario I, Scenario ll's specifications are such that the reliability is no more sensitive 
to changes in the mean than to changes in the standard deviation. For instance, Sub-Scenario II-A has a 
reduced mean .fip1) but an improved reliability fJ<1). This is due to its increased standard deviation 
if>J>1) being able to counterbalance the effects of the decreased mean fzJ> fiJ). In the same manner, 
Sub-Scenario 11-C has an improved mean fjJ<1) but a reduced reliability fp1 ). And in the same way, 
this is due to its decreased standard deviation .fiJ<1) neutralizing the good effects of the increased mean 
if>J< Jij). 
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The two scenarios can also be described graphically in relation to their t.var(DOif=O and LlDOt~ lines. 
Refer to Figures 14 and 15 below. Figure 14 shows the amij_ am2i points for Scenarios I (denoted as Sl) 
and II (denoted as Sll). lhe a'" 1i- am2i points for both scenarios fall above the LlDOt~o line and because 
of this, the DO mean increases whenever T1 is positive (as it is for Sub-Scenarios ~C. ~D. 11-C and 11-D), 
and decreases whenever T1 is negative (as it is for Sub-Scenarios ~A. ~B. II-A and 11-B). The Sl point lies 
farther from the LIDO/~ line than does the Sll point. This explains why the reliability is so much more 
sensitive to changes in the mean in Scenario I than in Scenario II. 
-0.5 .JL-~~~---~----~~ 
-0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 
mean a2j 
Figure 14: The effect of trading on the DO 
reliability index, fli for Scenarios I and II. 
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Figure 15: The effect of trading on the DO 
reliability for Scenarios I and II. 
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Figure 15 shows the var(a!j)-var(a2i) points for both scenarios. Again, the point for Scenario I is denoted 
as Sl while the point for Scenario II is denoted as Sll. Note that the Sl point falls below the t.var(DOj)~O 
line for T1 equal to -4[M/T], -2[M/T] and 2[M/T], but above the t.var(DO)=O line for T1 equal to 4[M/T]. 
This corresponds to the results in Table 2 that shows that the standard deviation increases with trading 
for Sub-Scenarios ~A. ~B and ~D. but decreases with trading for Sub-Scenario ~C. This proves the point 
put forth in the previous sub-section of how var(a!j)-var(a2i) combinations that fall below the t.var(DOif=O 
line wll cause the standard deviation to decrease with trading when T1 is positive, or to increase with 
trading when T1 is negative. The data for Scenario II further support this argument. The Sll point falls 
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above the L\.var(D01FO line for all four trading possibilities, which fully agrees with the observation that the 
standard deviation increases for the sub-scenarios where T1 is positive (Sub-Scenarios 11-C and 11-D}, but 
decreases for the sub-scenarios where T1 is negative (Sub-Scenarios II-A and 11-B). It is also interesting 
to note that the Sll point is farther away from the L\.var(D01Fo line than is the Sl point. This explains why 
changes in the standard deviation are more able to override the effects of changes in the mean for 
Scenario II, than for Scenario I. 
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4.0 METHODOLOGY 
One of the objectives of this study is better to understand how discharge permit trading might affect the 
mean and variation of environmental quality. To demonstrate the methods developed, two riverine 
systems are analyzed. The first is the Willamette River in Oregon, USA and the second is the Athabasca 
River in Alberta, Canada. 
The Willamette River is approximately 300 km long, with a drainage basin of around 29785 km2 in area. 
Bounded by the Coast and Cascade mountain ranges, its mainstem flows in a northerly direction before 
discharging into the Columbia River just downstream of Portland. Not only is the Willamette River popular 
for fishing and recreation, it is also a key drinking water source for numerous communities alongside it. 
There are over fifty municipal and industrial facilities [Tetra Tech, 1995] discharging into the river. This 
study assumes seventeen of these dischargers, comprised of eleven municipal Wastewater Treatment 
Plants (WWTP) and six Pulp and Paper Mills (PPM), as controlled sources, and the remaining as 
uncontrolled sources. 
The Athabasca River begins in the Columbia Ice Field glacier in the Canadian Rockies, and is the longest 
river in Alberta. It measures 1538 km in length from its origin at the Columbia lcefield in the Jasper 
National Park to its mouth at Lake Athabasca in the Wood Buffalo National Park. The Athabasca River is 
prized for its outstanding natural beauty, historical significance and recreational value. Like most of 
Northern Alberta, the Athabasca River Basin is largely forested, making it an important source of 
pulpwood for paper-making. There are nine sizeable point source facilities discharging into the river, 
mostly PPMs and WWTPs. This study considers five of these facilities, all of which are PPMs, as 
controlled sources, and the remaining four as uncontrolled sources. Of the five controlled sources, four 
discharge directly into the Athabasca River and one indirectly via the Lesser Slave River, which is a 
tributary to the Athabasca River. 
Table 3 gives further details of the controlled sources and was compiled from information provided by 
Tetra Tech [1995] and Tolson [2000], for the Willamette River, and from Macdonald and Hamilton [1989] 
for the Athabasca River. 
Each system is modeled and simulated to predict how it might behave under a Tradable Discharge Permit 
(TOP) program. For each system, an environmental-response model and a permit-trading model are 
developed, and by linking the two models together, the system is first optimized to determine its initial 
permit allocation, then re-optimized to find its final TDP equilibrium. A comparison between a system's 
environmental quality before and after trading (characterized as the water quality reliability) can then be 
made. This is so to gain some quantitative measure of how trading might cause the environment to 
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Table 3: List of controlled point dischargers for the Willamette and Athabasca Rivers. 
# Controlled Point Discharger Industry (PPM Subtype) Location (RK) 
The Willamette River Case 
Metropolitan W!W Management Commission WVVTP 16 
2 Pope & Talbot Inc. PPM (Alkaline-Market) 65 
3 James River Paper Co. Inc. PPM (Deink-Fine & Tissue) 65 
4 City of Corvallis WVVTP 91 
5 City of Albany WVVTP 111 
6 Willamette Industries Inc. PPM (Alkaline-Unbleached) 115 
7 City of Salem WVVTP 176 
8 City of Newberg WVVTP 221 
9 Smurfit Newsprint Corp. (Newberg) PPM (Groundwood-Fine) 221 
10 City of Wilsonville WVVTP 239 
11 City of Canby WVVTP 248 
12 Smurfit Newsprint Corp. (Oregon City) PPM (Oeink-Newsprint) 257 
13 Simpson Paper Company PPM (Oeink-Fine & Tissue) 259 
14 Tri-City Service District WVVTP 261 
15 City of Portland WVVTP 269 
16 Oak Lodge Sanitary District WVVTP 269 
17 Clackamas Co. Service District# 1 WVVTP 272 
The Athabasca River Case 
Welwood of Canada ltd. PPM (Alkaline-Market) 14 
3 Alberta Newsprint Company PPM (Nonintegrated Boards) 203 
2 Millar Western Pulp Ltd. PPM (Nonintegrated Boards) 212 
4 Alberta Energy Company (AEC) PPM (Nonintegrated Boards) 498 
5 Alberta Pacific Forest Industries Inc. PPM (Aikaline~Market) 610 
Notes: 
1. PPM Subtype as deft ned by E.C. Jordan [1979]. 
2. RK 0 is defined as the most upstream point of the river being modeled. 
3. AEC discharges into the Lesser Slave River, which is a tributary that discharges into the Athabasca River at RK 498. 
4. Table compiled from Tetra Tech [1995], Tolson [2000] and Macdonald & Hamilton [1989]. 
change, and from there to pass judgment on whether or not unrestricted trading is an appropriate means 
of pollution control. 
In this study, environmental quality is measured as the reliability of the DO concentration meeting a 
certain pre-set standard, where reliability can be defined as the probability of the system performing as 
desired or better. The DO concentration is an appropriate measure of environmental quality. Prolonged 
exposure to low DO levels will cause fish stress, if not fish kill. Furthermore, a healthy DO concentration 
is required to prevent anaerobic conditions that will render the water aesthetically unpleasing. This use of 
reliability is a parsimonious and environmentally meaningful way of combining concepts of mean and 
variance of the critical water quality parameter i.e. the DO concentration. 
To further limit the scope of this study, only BOD wasteloads are considered regulated and tradable. 
Nitrogen, phosphorus and other waste discharges are either assumed negligible and not included in the 
model, as for the Athabasca River case, or kept constant and uninfluenced by trading, as for the 
Willamette River case. 
For details of the computational work involved and the assumptions made, refer to the following sub-
sections. Sub-Section 4.1 describes the environmental-response models developed for each river, while 
Sub-Section 4.2 explains further the permit-trading model. 
4.1 Environmental-Response Model 
Recall from Section 3.1 that equation (5) gives the DO concentration at a point in a river, and, for 
stochastic systems, equations (8) and (9) the reliability of the DO concentration meeting a certain pre-set 
standard. In these equations, DOj, Bj and a,j are random variables characterized in terms of their means, 
variances and covariances. Their randomness represents the environment's stochastic nature, 
particularly, the variation of stream fiow and water temperature. W; is deterministic as ~ is a function only 
of human decisions and thus, independent of environmental fluctuations. In this study, DOj and {3 are 
output variables, W; an input variable and Bj and au input parameters. The following sub-sections explain 
how the Bj and au distributions were derived for first the Willamette River case, then the Athabasca River 
case. 
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4.1.1 The Willamette Ril.er 
For the Willamette River case, the B1 and au distributions were derived, using Latin Hypercube simulation, 
from a modification of the Tetra Tech QUAL2EU Willamette River model [Tetra Tech, 1995], with data 
from Tolson [2000]. For details of the QUAL2EU Water Quality Model, refer to Brown & Barnwell [1987]. 
The original Tetra Tech QUAL2EU model [Tetra Tech, 1995] is one-dimensional and steady state. It 
divides the Willamette mainstem into 141 reaches of uniform physical characteristics, with each reach 
being further divided into 0.161 km long elements. Included in the model are 53 point-source dischargers 
and 14 tributaries. The model was calibrated using August 1992 data, and verified using August 1994 
data. The model was specifically designed for the critical low-ftow, high-temperature months of July, 
August and September. The model is fairly comprehensive. It does not neglect the interdependencies 
between the nitrogen, phosphorus and algae concentrations, nor their effects on the DO concentration 
profile. Nevertheless, it is not entirely accurate. It fails to consider the effect of backwater mixing from the 
Columbia River, which is not insignificant for the portion of the river between Willamette Falls and the river 
mouth. It also wrongly neglects non-point source discharges. 
The original Tetra Tech QUAL2EU model (Tetra Tech, 1995] is deterministic. To meet the purposes of 
this study, the original model was modified according to suggestions by Tolson (2000]. The input 
variables for stream ftow, temperature and Sediment Oxygen Demand (SOD), originally deterministic 
constants, were re-entered as random variables, characterized by probability distribution functions, to 
reftect the stochastic environment. Refer to Table A1 in Appendix A, which was compiled by Tolson 
[2000], who estimated the stream fiow and temperature probability distribution functions from historical 
data collected by the United States Geological Society (USGS) (refer to www.usgs.gov), and the SOD 
probability distribution function from field data by Tetra Tech (1995]. 
As suggested by Tolson [2000], for the stream fiow, only the headwater ftows for the Willamette River 
mainstem and three of its major tributaries i.e. the McKenzie, Santiam and Clackamas Rivers, were made 
random. The headwater ftows for the remaining eleven tributaries were kept deterministic at their August 
1992 values. As for the temperature, of which a separate input value is required for each reach, only the 
input for Reach 81 (at Salem at RK 135) was made random. This is due to the scarcity of historical data. 
The input temperature values for the other reaches were held deterministic but as functions of the Reach 
81 input. For the SOD, which was deemed negligible by Tetra Tech (1995] for portions of the river 
upstream of RK 81, both SOD input values were randomized. The first SOD input value is for the river 
section between RK 42 and RK 81, while the second input value is for the river section between the river 
mouth and RK 42. The SOD was further assumed to be uniform within each section. 
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Tolson [2000] also suggested changes to the DO reaeration coefficient. The original Tetra Tech [1995] 
model determines the reaeration coefficient using the O'Connor and Dobbins [1958] equation, which 
calculates lhe reaeration coefficient from the average stream velocity and depth. However, the O'Connor 
and Dobbins [1958] equation does not always give predictions that match reality. The O'Connor and 
Dobbins [1958] equation in the original model was therefore modified to include an error term. Based on 
work by Melching and Flores [1999], who developed a database of more than 370 measured reaeration 
coefficient values, Tolson [2000] proposed that error term be random, and varying according to the 
probability distribution function given in Table A-1. 
Tolson [2000] also determined correlation coefficients between the various random variables (refer to 
Table A-2 in Appendix A). With the data and suggestions by Tolson [2000] applied, the Tetra Tech [1995] 
QUAL2EU model was then re-programmed into a spreadsheet. 
Table 4: Mean a,, and s, for the river mouth at RK 300 for Willamette River case 
Item Discharger Mean for the River Mouth i.e.j; RK 300 
Btj Metropolitan W/W Management Commission -0.864 
B2j Pope & Talbot Inc. -0.958 
83j James River Paper Co. Inc. -0.958 
84j City of Corvalis -1.004 
Bsj Cily of Albany -1.043 
86j Willamette Industries Inc. -1.057 
87j City of Salem -1.241 
8Bj City of Newberg -1.307 
89j Smurtit Newsprint Corp. (Newberg) -1.307 
Btoj City of Wilsonville -1.343 
Bttj City of Canby -1.377 
Bt2i Smumt Newsprint Corp. (Oregon City) -1.403 
Bt3i Simpson Paper Company -1.363 
Bt4i Tri-City Service District -1.399 
BtsJ City of Portland -1.381 
8t6j Oak Lodge Sanitary District -1.353 
817J Clackamas Co. Service District# 1 -1.306 
s, 6.788 
Notes: 
1. The BiJ means are in the units of (mg/L)/(kg BODu/s). The Bi mean is in the units of mg/L. 
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Table 5: a;rBi variance/covariance matrix for the river mouth at RK 300 for the Willamette River. 
Item a1j a2i a3i a4i asi a6i a7i aaJ agi a10i a11i a12i a13i a14i a15i a16i a17i Bi 
a,, 0.020 0.022 0.022 0.024 0.025 0.025 0.030 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.030 0.030 0.029 0.028 0.027 0.016 
a,, 0.022 0.025 0.025 0.027 0.028 0.028 0.034 0.036 0.036 0.035 O.D36 0.035 0.034 0.035 0.033 0.033 0.031 0.018 
a,, 0.022 0.025 0.025 0.027 0.028 0.028 0.034 0.036 0.036 O.D35 0.036 0.035 0.034 0.035 0.033 0.033 0.031 0.018 
a,, 0.024 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.030 0.030 0.036 .0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.037 0.038 0.036 0.035 0.033 0.018 
a5, 0.025 0.028 0.028 0.030 0.031 0.032 0.038 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.039 0.040 0.038 0.037 0.035 0.019 
a,, O.Q25 0.028 0.028 0.030 0.032 0.032 0.039 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.041 0.041 0.040 0.040 0.039 0.038 0.036 0.019 
a,, 0.030 0.034 0.034 0.036 0.038 0.039 0.047 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.050 0.050 0.049 0.050 0.048 0.047 0.045 0.021 
a,, 0.031 0.036 0.036 0.038 0.040 0.040 0.049 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.053 0.054 0.052 0.053 0.052 0.051 0.049 0.019 
a,, 0.031 0.036 0.036 O.D38 0.040 0.040 0.049 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.053 0.054 0.052 0.054 0.052 0.051 0.049 0.019 
a,, 0.031 0.035 O.D35 O.D38 0.040 0.040 0.049 0.052 0.052 0.054 0.055 0.056 0.055 0.056 0.055 0.054 0.052 0.015 
a,, 0.031 0.036 0.036 0.038 0.040 0.041 0.050 0.053 0.053 0.055 0.057 0.059 0.057 0.059 0.058 0.056 0.055 0.011 
a,, 0.031 0.035 0.035 0.038 0.040 0.041 0.050 0.054 0.054 0.056 0.059 0.061 0.059 0.061 0.060 0.059 0.057 0.007 
a,, 0.030 0.034 0.034 0.037 0.039 0.040 0.049 0.052 0.052 0.055 0.057 0.059 0.058 0.060 0.059 0.058 0.056 0.005 
a,., 0.030 0.035 0.035 O.D38 0.040 0.040 0.050 0.053 0.054 0.056 0.059 0.061 0.060 0.061 0.060 0.059 0.058 0.005 
a,, 0.029 0.033 0.033 O.D36 0.038 0.039 0.048 0.052 0.052 0.055 0.058 0.060 0.059 0.060 0.060 0.059 0.058 0.001 
a,, 0.028 0.033 0.033 0.035 0.037 0.038 0.047 0.051 0.051 0.054 0.056 0.059 0.058 0.059 0.059 0.058 0.057 0.000 
a,TJ 0.027 0.031 0.031 0.033 0.035 0.036 0.045 0.049 0.049 0.052 0.055 0.057 0.056 0.058 0.058 0.057 0.056 -0.002 
~ o~16 oo18 o.018 M18 oms o.o1s 0~1 oo19 oo19 oo15 om1 o.- ~ o.- ~1 o~~~ 
Notes: 
1. The i in au is the discharger number. The dischargers are numbered according to Tables 3 and 6. 
2. The a;ra;i variances/covariances are in the units of [(mg/L)/(kg BODjs)f The aij~Bi covariances are in the units of (mg/L)2/{kg BODJs). The BrBi variance is in the units of {mg/L)2. 
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Multiple realizations of B1 and au were then derived using a Latin Hypercube simulation, with the help of 
the software @Risk by Palisade \Vww.palisade.com). The au were derived for each of the seventeen 
controlled sources (refer to Table 3). B1 and au were derived for the river mouth, which preliminary studies 
found to be the system's sole critical point. B1 was derived by setting to zero Wt for all seventeen of the 
controlled sources. The resulting D01 gives B1. au for the first discharger was then determined by setting 
to zero Wt for all but the first of the controlled sources, which was set to a unit discharge amount. The 
resulting D01 subtracted by s1 gives au for the first discharger. In the same manner, a11 for the subsequent 
dischargers was found. 
The Latin Hypercube simulation was carried out for 5000 iterations to obtain 5000 realizations of s1 and 
au. Based on the 5000 realizations, the B1 and au distributions were determined using common statistical 
methods. Refer to Tables 4 and 5 above for the s1 and a11 means, variances and covariances found. 
These values were then introduced into equations (5), (8) and (9) to estimate the river's critical DO 
reliability as a function of f¥t. 
4.1.2 The Athabasca River 
The B1 and a,1 distributions for the Athabasca River were derived from the thirty lowest stream flow values 
for each year from the period 1963-92, the common period for the four principal gauges on the river, 
Hinton, Whitecourt, Athabasca, and Ft. McMurray [Burn, Personal communication, 1990]. These 
streamflow data were incorporated into a modified version of the Streeter-Phelps model [Streeter & 
Phelps, 1925; Chapra, 1997]. The modified model includes the effects of oxygen demanding substances 
in the sedimentary layer i.e. the Sediment Oxygen Demand (SOD) and is one-dimensional, steady-state 
and deterministic. The model was based on data and schematics by Macdonald and Hamilton [1989], 
and was calibrated for the winter period. The Athabasca River is a winter-critical river. Low dilution rates, 
due to low flows, combined with an almost complete ice-cover, makes the winter period especially 
vulnerable to BOD discharges and high DO deficits. The model incorporates 25 tributaries, five PPMs, 
three WWTPs and one oil-processing plant. Note that one of the FPMs, the Alberta Energy Company 
(AEC), does not discharge directly into the Athabasca mainstem, but into the Lesser Slave River, a 
tributary. The model covers 1150 km of river, including the Lesser Slave River, with the town of Hinton 
being the most upstream point of interest. It divides the Athabasca mainstem into 52 reaches, and the 
Lesser Slave River into 4 reaches, each of uniform physical characteristics. 
By partitioning the Streeter-Phelps model into seven BOD compartments (one for each of the fi\8 PPMs, 
one for the three WWTPs and the one oil-processing plant combined, and one for the background BOD) 
and by running the modified model multiple times, each time with a different set of flow inputs, Eheart 
[Personal communication, 2002] was able to derive multiple realizations of s1 and au. In this model, B1 is 
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defined as the DO concentration when the five PPM wasteloads are set zero but the WWTP and oil-
processing plant wasteloads maintained at their original rates given in the Macdonald and Hamilton 
[ 1989] report. 
In total, Eheart [Personal communication, 2002] obtained thirty realizations of B1 and a11 from thirty years 
worth of low-fiow data. Refer to Table A3 in Appendix A for the low-fiow data. To estimate the stream 
fiow at portions of the river between the gauges, Eheart [Personal communication, 2002] had to pro-rate 
the measured data according to proportions derived from the 7010 ftows reported by Macdonald and 
Hamilton [1989]. 
The Athabasca River has two critical points, the first at RK 449 corresponding to Reach 27, which is just 
upstream of the Lesser Slave and Athabasca Rivers confiuence, and the second at RK 811 
corresponding to Reach 37, which is just upstream of the Grande Rapids. For simplicity sake, this study 
assumes that the ildividual reliabilities at the two critical locations are co-dependent such that they tend 
to vary together so that on the overall, the system reliability equals the reliability at the constraining 
location. s1 and au were found for both critical locations. Refer to Tables A-4 and A-5 in Appendix A for 
the thirty B1 and au realizations obtained. 
The s1 and au distributions, in terms of their variances, covariances and means, were found from the 
multiple s1 and au realizations, using common statistical methods. Refer to Tables 6 and 7 below for the 
results obtained, which subsequently were substituted into equations (5), (8) and (9) to determine the 
critical DO reliabilities subject to W;. 
Table 6: Mean a,1 and B1 for the Athabasca River case at RK 449 and RK 811. 
Mean for Reach 27 Mean for Reach 37 
i.e. j = RK449 i.e.j = RK811 Item Discharger 
a1i Welwood of Canada Ltd. -0.595 -0.322 
a21 Alberta Newsprint Company -0.105 -0.058 
83j Millar Western Pulp Ltd. -0.479 -0.228 
a,1 Alberta Energy Company (AEC) 0.000 -0.093 
a5i Alberta Pacific Forest Industries Inc. 0.000 -0.251 
B; 8.514 8.690 
Notes: 
1. The au means are in the units of (mg/L)/(ton BODs/d). The BJ mean is in the units of mg/l. 
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Table 7: The a;;-B; variance/covariance matrix for RK 449 and RK 811 for the Athabasca River. 
ltem a,; 8;>_j 83j 84j asj B; 
j = RK 449 at Reach 27 
81j 0.0081 0.0007 0.0047 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0122 
82j 0.0007 0.0001 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0029 
8sj 0.0047 0.0005 0.0033 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0064 
84j 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ae; 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
B; 
-0.0122 -0.0029 -0.0064 0.0000 0.0000 0.3416 
j = RK 811at Reach 37 
81j 0.0060 0.0009 0.0036 -0.0005 0.0039 0.0034 
82j 0.0009 0.0002 0.0006 -0.0001 0.0006 0.0005 
83j 0.0036 0.0006 0.0024 -0.0003 0.0025 0.0022 
a,; 
-0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0004 
asi 0.0039 0.0006 0.0025 -0.0002 0.0029 0.0026 
B; 0.0034 0.0005 0.0022 -0.0004 0.0026 0.0033 
Notes: 
1. The i in aiJ is the discharger number. The dischargers are numbered according to Tables 3 and 6. 
2. The 8iJ-8iJ variances/covariances are in the units of [(mg/L)/(ton BODs/d)]2• The aii-Bi covariances are in the 
the units of (mg/L)'/(ton BODdd). The 81-81 variance is in the units of (mg/L)'. 
4.2 Permit-Trading Model 
The permit-trading model can be divided into two parts, the first to determine the initial permit allocation, 
and the second to find the final TOP equilibrium. The model requires the input of certain cost data, which 
were taken from Tolson [2000], who updated figures by Van Note et al [1975] and E.C. Jordan [1979], for 
the Willamette River; and from Eheart [Personal communication, 2002], who referred to E.C. Jordan 
[1979], for the Athabasca River. Refer to Tables B-1 to B-17 in Appendix B for the Willamette River cost 
data, and Tables B-18 to B-22 for the Athabasca River cost data, used in this study. The tables also give 
the results obtained from the piecewise linearization of the raw data, which was carried out to convert the 
originally non-convex and discrete cost curves into a more manageable form that is not only convex but 
also linear. 
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4.2.1 Initial Permit Allocation Sub-Model 
At the onset of a TOP program, the program participants i.e. the controlled point dischargers are allocated 
a certain amount of permits, each according to some formula that is equitable to all stakeholders involved. 
In this study, for the Willamette River case, that formula is taken to be a uniform-reduction equation i.e. 
the initial allocation is based on what the dischargers' wasteloads would be if they were required to 
reduce their current wasteloads by a certain uniform percentage. As for the Athabasca River case, where 
all the controlled sources are from the same industry, that formula is taken to be a uniform-production-
based equation i.e. the initial allocation is based on what the dischargers' wasteloads would be if they 
were required to limit their discharges to a certain uniform amount of BOD per unit of paper pulp 
production. 
The initial permit allocation for a system can thus be represented as the solution to the following 
optimization problem. 
I I K 
MIN Cost= LA- L,L,G,kwtk .......... (20) 
i=l i=l k=l 
Subject to the constraints 
P(DO j '?. Do;'d) = ¢(/3) '?. ex , j =all critical points .......... (22) 
K 
W, = L, w,k = f(R), all i .......... (23) 
k=l 
Where 
f3 DO'." - DO~'d J I 
I I I 
L, L, W,Wh cov(au,ahj )+ 2 L, W, cov(a,j,Bj )+var(Bj) 
.......... (8) 
i=l h=I i=l 
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A, is the extrapolated waste abatement cost for discharger i when W, is zero, w" is piece k of W, (W, is 
broken into several pieces by the piecewise linearization of the raw cost data), G" is the gradient for piece 
k of discharger i's cost curve, L;, is the w;k lower limit, U;k is the w;, upper limit, K is the total number of 
pieces w, breaks into, h is a general counting index, f(R} is some function of R, R is a constant determined 
by a and finally, a is the system's desired critical before-trading reliability. 
In the optimization of the above model, w;, are the decision variables. w;, sum over k to give W,. Note 
that, in this study, W, include only the discharge of BOD. The discharges of other pollutants, such as 
nitrogen and phosphorus, are assumed regulated by other means and thus, for the Willamette River case, 
maintained constant at their original values given in the Tetra Tech QUAL2EU model [Tetra Tech, 1995], 
and, for the Athabasca River case, not included in the model. Note also that only the controlled sources 
(refer to Table 3) are simulated as participating in the TDP program. Therefore, I =17 for the Willamette 
River case, and I =5 for the Athabasca River case. The discharge rates for the remaining uncontrolled 
sources, for both BOD and non-BOD, are kept constant and unchanged during the optimization process. 
Equation ~0) is the objective function, which is to minimize the cost required to achieve a certain level of 
before-trading reliability. Equations (21) to (23) are the model constraints. Equation (21) bounds w,, to 
limits determined by the piecewise linearization of discharger i's cost curve. Equation (22) ensures the 
before-trading water quality is as desired or better. Equation (23) makes certain that W, are equitable to 
all stakeholders involved, where equity is defined by the function f(R}. Note that for the Willamette River 
case, 
f(R) = W,,o- RW,,o .......... (24) 
where Wi.o is discharger i's BOD discharge rate when there is minimal treatment. Wi.o is assumed to 
correspond to Treatment Option Level 1, as defined by Van Note et al [1975], for the WWTPs, and 
Treatment Option Level 0, as defined by E.G. Jordan [1979], for the PPMs. As for the Athabasca River 
case, 
f(R) =liP; .......... (25) 
where P; is discharger i's maximum possible daily production rate, as originally given by Macdonald and 
Hamilton [1989] and reproduced in Tables B-18 to B-22 in Appendix B. Note that R, which is a constant, 
is not an input variable but is instead, a function of w, and P;. 
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4.2.2 TDP Equilibrium Sub-Model 
Once the initial permit allocation is determined, the final TDP equilibrium can be found. To find the final 
TDP equilibrium, this study assumes ideal market conditions such that all trading will eventually lead to 
some least-cost solution i.e. the individual dischargers would trade solely to minimize costs and maximize 
profits. Market imperfections, like the presence of transaction costs, hoarding, or other inhibitions to 
trading, are ignored. Possible regulatory uncertainties, personal preferences and such other factors are 
also ignored. 
Under such assumptions, the final TDP equilibrium can be found by optimizing to 
I I K 
MIN Cost = LA, -L L G,, w" .......... (20) 
i=l i=l k=1 
Subject to the constraints 
L,, sw" sU", all i, all k .......... (21) 
LW, s W,01 , all i .......... (26) 
where W,01 is the total amount of permits issued. w;,, is a constant and an input variable derived from the 
initial permit allocation sub-model. As before, w1k are the decision variables. Equation (20) is the 
objective function. Equations (21) and (26) are the model constraints. Equation (26) limits the total 
discharge so that it does not exceed W,01 • Note that there is no water quality constraint. This is because 
the dischargers trade with regards only to their individual economics, and with total disregard to the 
environment. Thus, trading may render environmental quality worse or better, depending on the relative 
magnitudes of the dischargers' marginal waste abatement costs and au values. 
The w,k obtained from the solution to the optimization problem given by the equations above, substituted 
into the environmental-response model (equation (8)) then give the water quality reliability after trading. 
By comparing this reliability with that from the initial permit allocation sub-model, a quantitative measure 
of the potential impact that trading might have on the reliability of the water quality meeting environmental 
standards can then be made. 
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5.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The methodology described in Section 4.0 was applied, for both rivers, for a range of before-trading 
reliabilities (denoted as a in equation (22)). Refer to Figures 13 to 21, as well as Tables 8 and 9 and 
Tables C-1 to C-6 in Appendix C. 
Figures 16 and 17 give the cost-reliability tradeoff for the Willamette River and the Athabasca River cases 
respectively. For each case, the before-trading tradeoff is compared to the after-trading tradeoff, and 
both are further compared to the least-cost tradeoff, where the least-cost tradeoff is based on the most 
economical solution possible to achieve a given level of reliability. The least-cost solution can be found in 
the same manner as the TOP solution, but without having to consider lle limit on the total number of 
permits issued (equation (26)), and having to include in a check on the water quality reliability (equation 
(22)). The least-cost solution, though practically inapplicable due to its inequity, is provided as a 
benchmark to evaluate the economic efficiency of the other two solutions. 
As expected, the tradeoff curves, whether before-trading, after-trading or least-cost, all show that cost 
and reliability are inversely proportional to each other i.e. the higher the desired level of reliability, the 
higher the cost of attaining it. Note the arrows in Figures 16 and 17. The arrows are an indication of how 
trading might affect the system. For the Willamette River, the arrows are pointing downward and to the 
right. For the Athabasca River, the arrows are for the most part pointing downwards and to the left. This 
means that, in terms of cost, trading is advantageous for both cases. However, in terms of reliability, 
trading is advantageous only for the Willamette River case. FOr the Athabasca River, trading makes 
worse the reliability. 
For further details, refer to Tables G1 to G6 in Appendix C, which gives the wasteload allocations and 
cost figures for the before-trading, after-trading and least-cost scenarios. 
Figures 13 and 20 show more clearly the effect of trading on the reliability. For the Willamette River, 
trading seems to have little effect on the reliability i.e. the reliability remains almost constant with trading. 
The effect of trading is more obvious for the Athabasca River. This is possibly due to the Athabasca 
River being a larger system but with fewer controlled dischargers that are located relatively farther from 
each other. The Willamette River is four times less the length of the portion of the Athabasca River 
modeled here, but has three times the number of controlled dischargers that are located relatively closer 
to each other. This difference between the Willamette and Athabasca systems is reflected in their av 
distributions. The av mean, variance and covariances for one discharger are more different from those for 
another for the Athabasca River than for the Willamette River. This means that the Athabasca River is 
more sensitive to locational effects due to trading than is the Willamette River. 
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This observation raises an interesting question of when locational effects are significant and when not. 
For a deterministic system, the answer is simple. Locational effects are negligible when the deterministic 
au for one discharger is close enough b the au for another. However, for stochastic systems where the 
effects of changes in the mean could either be reinforced or diminished by changes in the standard 
deviation, the answer is not as straightforward. Section 3.2 attempts to give some insight to this question. 
However, suggestions given there are by no means final. 
Tables 8 and 9 give the F, fiJ and hJ ratios, as well as others details of system changes due to trading for 
the two rivers analyzed. It is interesting to note that for both systems, the mean dominates the standard 
deviation. For the Willamette River, the standard deviation is unchanging with trading. For the 
Athabasca River, the standard deviation changes with trading but those changes are always smaller than 
the corresponding changes in the mean. This is reflected by the Willamette River's hJ ratios that are 
always unity and the Athabasca River's hJ ratios that are always, though not unity, nearer to unity than 
their corresponding fiJ ratios. In other words, the reliability tends to follow the mean- that is, where there 
is an increase in the mean, there will be an increase in the reliability and vice versa- while the standard 
deviation is almost a non-issue. 
For further illustration, refer to Figures 1l and 21, which show, for the before-trading reliability of 85%, 
how the DO concentration probability distribution function (PDF) and the cumulative PDF change with 
trading, for the Willamette and Athabasca Rivers respectively. For the Willamette River, trading shifts the 
mean of the PDF to the right while maintaining its spread. For the Athabasca River, trading shifts the 
mean to the left while very slightly increasing its spread. 
It is uncertain if this observation, of the mean dominating the standard deviation, is typical for most, if not 
all, environmental systems. If it is, the impact of trading on the water quality reliability can be deduced by 
simply looking at the impact of trading on the water quality mean. And thus, the need for complicated 
stochastic models is eliminated, and instead simpler deterministic models should suffice. However, if the 
mean is not always the dominating factor, is it then helpful to understand the conditions under which the 
mean dominates, or otherwise. The answers to these questions raised are not immediately obvious, and 
it remains a challenge to find them. 
The policy-maker might find the findings so far useful. It is true that, considering the many unresolved 
uncertainties involved in modeling a river accurately and predicting how the various TOP participants 
might react, it is hard to say if it is any more accurate to design a TOP program based on reliability than to 
design it based on some deterministic conservative scenario. Nevertheless, it is believed that this work is 
a step forward in giving a more complete picture of the effect trading might have on the environment. 
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Like all other studies, this study is not without assumptions. Firstly, there is the assumption of ideal 
market conditions with zero transaction costs. In reality, especially when the number of program 
participants is limited as it is for the Willamette and Athabasca Rivers, and if there is a lack of an effective 
central authority to connect potential buyers to potential sellers, ideal market conditions are hard to 
achieve. This means that in reality, it is difficult to predict how trading might proceed, and hence difficult 
to predict how trading might affect the environment. 
Secondly, the theory and methodology presented in this study are best applicable for cases where there 
is a single critical point such that as long as the desired level of reliability at that one point is satisfied, the 
reliability of the entire system on the overall will also be satisfied. It is also suitable to be applied to multi-
critical point systems where the critical points are co-dependent such that the environmental quality at the 
different points tend to vary together so that the on the overall, the system reliability equals the reliability 
at the constraining point. However, for multi-critical point cases where the critical points are not co-
dependent, the MFOSM method is not the most appropriate as it is then unable to calculate for the overall 
system reliability, but only the individual reliability at each critical point. Thus, for such cases, other 
methods such as those based on multiple realizations [Morgan et al, 1993; Takyi and Lence, 1999] are 
more fitting. 
Finally, there is the issue of whether or not reliability by itself is an adequate measure of environmental 
quality. Reliability is simply a measure of the probability of the water quality standard being violated. It 
bears no indication of the vulnerability [Hashimoto et al, 1982] of the system, which is a measure of the 
severity of the violation. Neither does it account for the resilience [Fiering, 1982; Holling, 1996] of the 
system, which is a measure of the time required for the system to recover from a violation. A more 
comprehensive measure of environmental quality would include these other indices. 
Nonetheless, the methods and concepts described in this study are computationally convenient and easy 
to implement, and should suffice for many analyses of reliability as it relates to trading. 
45 
Table 8: System changes due to trading for the Athabasca River for the DO concentration standard of 5 mg/L 
Desired Before-Trade Reliability 
First Possible Critical Point at RK 449 
Before-trade mean (mg/L) 
Before-trade std deviation (mg/L) 
Before-trade reliability 
After-trade mean (mg/L) 
After-trade std deviation (mg/L) 
After-trade reliability 
Second Possible Critical Point at RK 811 
Before-trade mean {mg/L) 
Before-trade std deviation (mg/L} 
Before-trade reliability 
After-trade mean (mg/L) 
After-trade std deviation {mg/L) 
After-trade reliability 
0.99 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.20 0.10 
6.36 5.99 5.78 5.64 
0.59 0.60 0.61 0.62 
0.99 0.95 0.90 0.85 
5.90 5.90 5.72 5.52 
0.62 0.62 0.63 0.64 
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0.62 0.63 0.64 
0.80 0.75 0.70 
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0.64 0.64 0.64 
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Statistics for Critical of Points RK 449 and RK 811 
Before-trade reliability index, 13J,old 
After-trade reliability index, 13j,new 
Mean f ratio, f 1J 
Standard deviation f ratio, f2j 
Overall F ratio, Fi 














0.92 0.81 0.89 
1.03 1.03 1.02 















0.13 0.00 -0.13 -0.25 -0.39 -0.52 





















-0.06 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 O.Q1 0.04 -0.01 -0.06 -0.10 -0.08 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.09 -0.13 -0.09 
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Table 9: System changes due to trading for the Willamette River for the DO concentration standard of 5 mg/L. 
Desired Before-Trade Reliability 0.99 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 
Critical Point at RK 300 
Before-trade mean (mg/L) 6.34 5.98 5.78 5.64 5.52 5.42 5.33 5.25 5.16 5.08 5.00 4.92 4.83 4.73 4.63 4.52 4.39 
Before-trade std deviation (mg/L) 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.73 
Before-trade reliability 0.99 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 
After-trade mean (mg/L) 6.37 6.03 5.86 5.71 5.59 5.50 5.41 5.32 5.23 5.14 5.05 4.95 4.86 4.76 4.66 4.54 4.39 
After-trade std deviation (mg/L) 0.58 0.59 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.73 
After-trade reliability 0.99 0.96 0.92 0.88 0.83 0.79 0.74 0.69 0.64 0.58 0.53 0.47 0.42 0.36 0.31 0.26 0.20 
Statistics for Critical Point RK 300 
Before-trade reliability index, 13j,okl 2.33 1.64 1.28 1.04 0.84 0.67 0.52 0.39 0.25 0.13 0.00 -0.13 -0.25 -0.39 -0.52 -0.67 -0.84 
After-trade reliability index, 13j,oew 2.37 1.74 1.42 1.16 0.96 0.80 0.65 0.50 0.35 0.21 O.D? -O.D? -0.21 -0.36 -0.49 -0.65 -0.84 
Mean f ratio, f 1j 1.02 1.06 1.11 1.12 1.14 1.19 1.24 1.29 1.38 1.66 0.57 0.83 0.92 0.94 0.97 0.99 
Standard deviation f ratio, f2 j 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Overall F ratio, Fi 1.02 1.06 1.11 1.12 1.14 1.19 1.25 1.30 1.39 1.66 0.57 0.83 0.92 0.94 0.97 0.99 
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Figure 19: The effect of trading on the DO concentration 
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Figure 20: The effect of trading on the DO concentration 
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6.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A review of some of the uncertainties facing the successful implementation of a tradable discharge permit 
program is made. Uncertainties due to market unpredictability, together with modeling difficulties, make it 
a challenge to be able to predict accurately a priori how a trading program might proceed. This study 
focuses on the modeling uncertainties associated with environmental variables, such as stream fiow and 
temperature, that are, due to their randomness, more difficult to characterize than their deterministic 
counterparts usually present in closed controlled systems. To estimate the effects of trading on the 
stochastic environment, the MFOSM method is applied to two riverine case studies i.e. the Willamette and 
the Athabasca Rivers. The before- and after-trading reliabilities of each river's DO concentration meeting 
the pre-set standard of 5 mg/L are calculated and compared. 
It is confirmed that trading does indeed affect the reliability of a system, albeit only slightly in the 
examples presented here for any reasonable target reliability to be achieved. This is primarily due to the 
inherent characteristic of trading programs that redistributes the system's discharge locations. Whether 
the effect of trading is negative or positive depends on the system's individual characteristics. For the 
Willamette River, trading improves the reliability, but for the Athabasca River, trading degrades the 
reliability. 
It is also found that trading affects a system's mean more than its standard deviation, at least for the 
Willamette and Athabasca Rivers. This means that the reliability, which is a function of the mean and 
standard deviation, tends to change with the mean as whatever corresponding changes in the standard 
deviation are relatively insignificant. However, no conclusion can be made of whether or not this 
observation is true for all environmental systems. If it is true that the mean dominates the standard 
deviation always, then the need for complex stochastic models is reduced as simpler deterministic models 
become sufficient. And if the opposite applies, then it is useful to understand the circumstances under 
which the mean and the standard deviation are equally dominant, or under which the standard deviation 
dominates. 
There remains much work to be undertaken before the many uncertainties facing a trading program can 
be fully quantified, assuming that they are quantifiable. Permit trading bears much potential as a cost-
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Table A-1: Input random variable distributions for the Willamette River stochastic environmental response model. 
Random Variable Parameter 1 Parameter 2 Parameter 3 
Flow- Willamette River at RK 0 (m3/s) mean= 62.3 std dev = 13.7 
Flow- McKenzie River (m3/s) mean= 68.3 std dev = 12.5 
Flow- Santiam River (m3/s) location= 0 shape= 6.1 scale= 41.8 
Flow- Clackamas River (m3/s) mean= 26.2 std dev = 4.8 
Temperature - Salem (0 C) mean= 21.2 std dev = 1.2 
SOD. RK 0 to RK 42 (g/m2-d) mean= 2.12 std dev = 0.6 
SOD-RK42 RK81 (g/m2-d) mean= 1.98 std dev = 0.52 
Reaeration Coefficient {K a ) Error Term (-) mean=-0.111 std dev = 0.155 
Notes: 
1. The Ka errortenn is defined as error= log10 (Ka by the O'Connor & Dobbins Eqn) -log10 (real Ka ). Ka is in units of 1/d. 
2. Table from Tolson [2000]. 
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Table A-2: Correlation coeffcient matrix for the Willamette River stochastic environmental response model. 
Variable No. 2 3 
1.0 0.0 0.0 
2 0.0 1.0 0.0 
3 0.0 0.0 1.0 
4 0.0 0.0 0.7 
5 0.0 0.0 -0.8 
6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Notation 
Variable 1 =Flow- Willamette River at RK 0 (m3/s) 
Variable 2 = Flow- McKenzie River (m3/s) 
Variable 3 =Flow- Santiam River (m3!s) 
Variable 4 =Flow- Clackamas River (m3/s) 
Notes: 
1. Table from Tolson [2000]. 
4 5 6 7 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.7 -0.8 0.0 0.0 
1.0 -0.7 0.0 0.0 
-0.7 1.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0,0 
Variable 5 =Temperature- Salem (~C) 
Variable 6 =SOD- RK 0 to RK 42 (glm2-d) 










Variable 8 = Reaeration Coefficient (Ka) Error Term(-) 
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Table A-3: Historical low-flow data for the Athabasca River. 
Minimum Daily Flow, m3/s 
Year 
at Hinton at Whitecourt at Athabasca at McMurray 
1962 11.0 32.8 62.6 118.0 
1963 10.8 29.7 81.0 183.0 
1964 15.0 23.4 64.6 117.0 
1965 15.7 30.3 98.8 164.0 
1966 17.2 38.5 77.9 179.0 
1967 24.4 28.2 59.5 118.0 
1968 27.5 56.1 61.0 108.0 
1969 31.1 43.9 55.2 108.0 
1970 19.8 42.5 62.3 104.0 
1971 21.5 38.8 69.4 138.0 
1972 27.8 44.2 86.1 147.0 
1973 29.7 55.8 110.0 159.0 
1974 26.9 42.5 92.6 173.0 
1975 28.3 39.6 96.0 187.0 
1976 21.0 42.2 87.8 130.0 
1977 19.3 45.3 85.0 144.0 
1978 25.8 43.0 94.0 182.0 
1979 17.5 43.4 81.0 147.0 
1980 18.6 38.0 85.1 152.0 
1981 17.0 48.6 55.6 92.0 
1982 22.5 36.0 58.0 95.0 
1983 25.0 38.9 84.0 146.0 
1984 20.0 42.0 70.7 167.0 
1985 18.2 40.7 90.0 164.0 
1986 17.1 47.7 100.0 166.0 
1987 25.0 52.0 59.5 104.0 
1988 23.2 47.2 55.0 88.6 
1989 19.4 31.3 54.8 128.0 
1990 25.0 50.1 81.8 155.0 
1991 24.5 40.0 81.7 136.0 
Notes: 
1. Table compiled by Eheart [Personal communication, 2002]. 
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Table A-4: 30 realizations of a,1 and B1 for the Athabasca River's Reach 27 at RK 449. 
a1i (mg/L per ton 8005/d) Background DO, B1 Year 
for Welwood, i=1 for ANC, i=2 for Millar, i=3 for AEC, i=4 for AI-Pac, i=5 (mg/L) 
1962 -0.6200 -0.1153 -0.5518 0.0000 0.0000 8.4159 
1963 -0.5483 -0.1029 -0.4972 0.0000 0.0000 7.6741 
1964 -0.7477 -0.1134 -0.5889 0.0000 0.0000 7.6688 
1965 -0.5266 -0.0935 -0.4444 0.0000 0.0000 7.3399 
1966 -0.5736 -0.1043 -0.4766 0.0000 0.0000 8.3151 
1967 -0.8184 -0.1182 -0.5882 0.0000 0.0000 8.2531 
1968 -0.5847 -0.1091 -0.4660 0.0000 0.0000 9.6938 
1969 -0.7175 -0.1180 -0.5306 0.0000 0.0000 9.3878 
1970 -0.6357 -0.1133 -0.5113 0.0000 0.0000 9.0193 
1971 -0.6384 -0.1095 -0.5019 0.0000 0.0000 8.5921 
1972 -0.5597 -0.0989 -0.4377 0.0000 0.0000 8.4290 
1973 -0.4437 -0.0864 -0.3648 0.0000 0.0000 8.4167 
1974 -0.5427 -0.0960 -0.4270 0.0000 0.0000 8.1867 
1975 -0.5509 -0.0948 -0.4267 0.0000 0.0000 7.9654 
1976 -0.5368 -0.0984 -0.4391 0.0000 0.0000 8.2690 
1977 -0.5215 -0.0992 -0.4373 0.0000 0.0000 8.4880 
1978 -0.5314 -0.0953 -0.4226 0.0000 0.0000 8.1771 
1979 -0.5350 -0.1017 -0.4527 0.0000 0.0000 8.4928 
1980 -0.5568 -0.1003 -0.4581 0.0000 0.0000 8.1044 
1981 -0.6038 -0.1158 -0.5096 0.0000 0.0000 9.5471 
1982 -0.7334 -0.1183 -0.5557 0.0000 0.0000 8.8209 
1983 -0.5887 -0.1008 -0.4583 0.0000 0.0000 8.1992 
1984 -0.6007 -0.1079 -0.4862 0.0000 0.0000 8.7206 
1985 -0.5216 -0.0975 -0.4379 0.0000 0.0000 8.1319 
1986 -0.4536 -0.0919 -0.3989 0.0000 0.0000 8.2491 
1987 -0.6079 -0.1117 -0.4844 0.0000 0.0000 9.5747 
1988 -0.6561 -0.1168 -0.5173 0.0000 0.0000 9.5259 
1989 -0.7824 -0.1220 -0.5941 0.0000 0.0000 8.6312 
1990 -0.5331 -0.0997 -0.4317 0.0000 0.0000 8.8076 
1991 -0.5893 -0.1019 -0.4612 0.0000 0.0000 8.3165 
Notes: 
1. Table from Eheart [Personal communication, 2002]. 
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Table A-5: 30 realizations of a,1 and B1 for the Athabasca River's Reach 37 at RK 811. 
aii (mg/L per ton BODsfd) Background 00, B1 Year 
for Welwood, i=1 for ANC, i=2 for Millar, i=3 for AEC, i=4 for Al-Pac, i=S (mg/L) 
1962 -0.3053 -0.0564 -0.2424 -0.1094 -0.2845 8.6278 
1963 -0.1994 -0.0374 -0.1626 -0.0915 -0.1909 8.7025 
1964 -0.3305 -0.0470 -0.2270 -0.1291 -0.2853 8.6569 
1965 -0.2374 -0.0424 -0.1786 -0.1075 -0.2037 8.7582 
1966 -0.2376 -0.0438 -0.1753 -0.0838 -0.1954 8.6969 
1967 -0.3806 -0.0515 -0.2348 -0.1134 -0.2863 8.6466 
1968 -0.4260 -0.0839 -0.2995 -0.0519 -0.3069 8.6386 
1969 -0.4417 -0.0724 -0.2826 -0.0696 -0.3109 8.6243 
1970 -0.4055 -0.0732 -0.2866 -0.0963 -0.3155 8.6337 
1971 -0.3194 -0.0547 -0.2200 -0.0950 -0.2466 8.6711 
1972 -0.3087 -0.0562 -0.2127 -0.1005 -0.2273 8.7349 
1973 -0.2797 -0.0593 -0.2063 -0.0989 -0.2052 8.8048 
1974 -0.2639 -0.0480 -0.1835 -0.0928 -0.1968 8.7489 
1975 -0.2476 -0.0434 -0.1690 -0.0901 -0.1836 8.7587 
1976 -0.3201 -0.0606 -0.2323 -0.1153 -0.2501 8.7353 
1977 -0.2913 -0.0579 -0.2178 -0.1001 -0.2316 8.7185 
1978 -0.2501 -0.0463 -0.1762 -0.0892 -0.1883 8.7501 
1979 -0.2817 -0.0555 -0.2126 -0.0968 -0.2293 8.7028 
1980 -0.2744 -0.0503 -0.2002 -0.1031 -0.2216 8.7195 
1981 -0.4431 -0.0882 -0.3315 -0.0657 -0.3539 8.5869 
1982 -0.4535 -0.0713 -0.2978 -0.1122 -0.3429 8.6247 
1983 -0.3044 -0.0526 -0.2081 -0.1051 -0.2294 8.7260 
1984 -0.2665 -0.0486 -0.1904 -0.0773 -0.2095 8.6762 
1985 -0.2541 -0.0491 -0.1903 -0.0972 -0.2065 8.7315 
1986 -0.2441 -0.0529 -0.1939 -0.0962 -0.2013 8.7571 
1987 -0.4327 -0.0828 -0.3034 -0.0600 -0.3176 8.6265 
1988 -0.4920 -0.0894 -0.3396 -0.0703 -0.3653 8.5992 
1989 -0.3419 -0.0508 -0.2247 -0.0911 -0.2699 8.6165 
1990 -0.2927 -0.0575 -0.2103 -0.0847 -0.2192 8.7147 
1991 -0.3234 -0.0567 -0.2224 -0.1085 -0.2440 8.7189 
Notes: 
1. Table from Eheart [Personal communication, 2002]. 
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Tables B-1 to B-11: Willamette River WWTP Cost Data 
Note 1: Cost figures are in 1999 values and taken from Van Note et al [1975] and Tolson [2000]. 
Note 2: Effluent flowrates, and data for the raw wasteloads, are taken from Tolson [2000]. 
Note 3: Cost figures for the 100% removal treatment option (all) are extrapolated from the cost figures for the other treatment options. 
Note 4: The 8005 to BODu conversion factor is 2.5 for all the WWTPs [Tolson, 2000; Tetra Tech, 1993]. 
i = Metropolitan W/W Management Commission i = City of Salem 
Trt VFiow % Remv BODu Cone Cost Trt VFiow %Remv BODu Cone Cost Opt (ft3/s) (m9/L) (mil$/yr) Opt (ft3/s) (m9/L) (mil$/yr) 
Raw 39.61 0.0 307.50 0 Raw 47.65 0.0 740.00 0 
39.61 80.6 59.66 3.612 1 47.65 80.6 143.56 4.171 
2 39.61 90.6 28.91 3.912 2 47.65 90.6 69.56 4.531 
3 39.61 94.2 17.84 4.642 3 47.65 94.2 42.92 5.374 
4 39.61 97.1 8.92 5.812 4 47.65 97.1 21.46 6.689 
5 39.61 97.7 7.07 7.056 5 47.65 97.7 17.02 8.162 
6 39.61 99.1 2.77 9.405 6 47.65 99.1 6.66 10.938 
All 39.61 100.0 0.00 11.022 All 47.65 100.0 0.00 12.850 
i = City of Albany i = City of Corvalis 
Trt VFiow % Remv BODu Cone Cost Trt VFiow % Remv BODu Cone Cost Opt (ft3/s) (m9/L) (mil$/yr) Opt (ft3/s) (m9/L) (mil$/yr) 
Raw 7.89 0.0 565.00 0 Raw 9.59 0.0 527.50 0 
7.89 80.6 109.61 1.273 1 9.59 80.6 102.34 1.421 
2 7.89 90.6 53.11 1.342 2 9.59 90.6 49.59 1.505 
3 7.89 94.2 32.77 1.610 3 9.59 94.2 30.60 1.803 
4 7.89 95.4 25.99 1.819 4 9.59 95.4 24.27 2.046 
5 7.89 97.1 16.39 2.020 5 9.59 97.1 15.30 2.270 
6 7.89 98.1 10.74 2.638 6 9.59 98.1 10.02 2.995 
7 7.89 99.1 5.09 2.865 7 9.59 99.1 4.75 3.244 
All 7.89 100.0 0.00 3.245 All 9.59 100.0 0.00 3.682 
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i = City of Newberg i = City of Wilsonville 
Trt VFiow % Remv BODu Cone Cost Trt VFiow %Remv BODu Cone Cost Opt (ft3/s) (mg/L) (mil$/yr) Opt (ft3/s) (mg/L) (mil$/yr) 
Raw 2.48 0.0 522.50 0 Raw 2.63 0.0 700.00 0 
2.48 80.6 101.37 0.701 1 2.63 80.6 135.80 0.575 
2 2.48 90.6 49.12 0.728 2 2.63 90.6 65.80 0.593 
3 2.48 92.8 37.62 0.896 3 2.63 92.8 50.40 0.731 
4 2.48 94.2 30.31 0.904 4 2.63 94.2 40.60 0.751 
5 2.48 95.4 24.04 1.015 5 2.63 95.4 32.20 0.787 
6 2.48 96.4 18.81 1.093 6 2.63 96.4 25.20 0.875 
7 2.48 97.1 15.15 1.100 7 2.63 97.1 20.30 0.894 
8 2.48 98.1 9.93 1.421 8 2.63 98.1 13.30 1.150 
9 2.48 99.1 4.70 1.556 9 2.63 99.1 6.30 1.223 
All 2.48 100.0 0.00 1.761 All 2.63 100.0 0.00 1.371 
i = City of Portland i = Tri-City Service District 
Trt VFiow % Remv BODu Cone Cost Trt VFiow % Remv BODu Cone Cost Opt (ft3/s) (mg/L) (mil$/yr) Opt (ft3/s) (mg/L) (mil$/yr) 
Raw 97.47 0.0 750.00 0 Raw 9.28 0.0 687.50 0 
97.47 80.6 145.50 7.266 1 9.28 80.6 133.38 1.395 
2 97.47 90.6 70.50 7.956 2 9.28 90.6 64.63 1.476 
3 97.47 94.2 43.50 9.474 3 9.28 94.2 39.88 1.767 
4 97.47 97.1 21.75 11.589 4 9.28 95.4 31.63 2.006 
5 97.47 97.7 17.25 13.820 5 9.28 97.1 19.94 2.223 
6 97.47 99.1 6.75 19.201 6 9.28 98.1 13.06 2.924 
All 97.47 100.0 0.00 22.660 7 9.28 99.1 6.19 3.173 
All 9.28 100.0 0.00 3.601 
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i = Clackamas Co. Service District #1 i = Oak Lodge Sanitary District 
Trt VFiow % Remv BODu Cone Cost Trt VFiow % Remv BODu Cone Cost Opt (ft3/s) (mg/L) (mil$/yr) Opt (ft3/s) (mg/L) (mil$/yr) 
Raw 11.14 0.0 825.00 0 Raw 4.02 0.0 550.00 0 
1 11.14 80.6 160.05 1.548 1 4.02 80.6 106.70 0.883 
2 11.14 90.6 77.55 1.643 2 4.02 90.6 51.70 0.921 
3 11.14 94.2 47.85 1.963 3 4.02 94.2 31.90 1.125 
4 11.14 95.4 37.95 2.234 4 4.02 95.4 25.30 1.235 
5 11.14 97.1 23.93 2.476 5 4.02 97.1 15.95 1.390 
6 11.14 97.7 18.98 2.746 6 4.02 98.1 10.45 1.803 
7 11.14 99.1 7.43 3.558 7 4.02 99.1 4.95 1.927 
All 11.14 100.0 0.00 4.080 All 4.02 100.0 0.00 2.169 
i = City of Canby 
Trt VFiow %Remv BODu Cone Cost Opt (ft3/s) (mg/L) (mil$/yr) 
Raw 1.55 0.0 475.00 0 
1.55 80.6 92.15 0.575 
2 1.55 90.6 44.65 0.593 
3 1.55 92.8 34.20 0.731 
4 1.55 94.2 27.55 0.751 
5 1.55 95.4 21.85 0.787 
6 1.55 96.4 17.10 0.875 
7 1.55 97.1 13.78 0.894 
8 1.55 98.1 9.03 1.150 
9 1.55 99.1 4.28 1.223 
All 1.55 100.0 0.00 1.371 
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Tables 8-12 to B-17: Willamette River PPM Cost Data 
Note 1: Cost figures are in 1999 values and taken from E.G. Jordan [1979] and Tolson [2000]. 
Note 2: The PPM production rates are taken from Tolson [2000]. 
Note 3: Cost figures for the 100% removal treatment option (all) are extrapolated from the cost figures for the other treatment options. 
Note 4: The 8005 to BODu conversion factor is 4.1 for all the PPMs, except for Pope and Talbot (conversion factor= 5.5) and James 
River (conversion factor= 2.7) [Tolson, 2000; Tetra Tech, 1993]. 
i = Pope and Talbot Inc. i = James River Paper Co. Inc. 
Trt VFiow VFiow BODu Cone Cost Trt VFiow VFlow BODu Cone Cost 
Opt (m3/ADT)' (ft3/s) (mg/L) (mil$/yr) Opt (m 3/ADT)' (ft3/s) (mg/L) (mil$/yr) 
0 164.70 45.10 t65.0 0.000 0 107.20 13.15 81.0 0.000 
137.60 37.68 165.0 1.458 77.20 9.47 81.0 0.335 
2 123.00 33.68 165.0 1.921 2 73.40 9.00 81.0 0.374 
3 123.00 33.68 82.5 8.589 3 73.40 9.00 40.5 2.540 
4 123.00 33.68 27.5 20.539 4 73.40 9.00 13.5 5.601 
All 123.00 33.68 0.0 26.514 All 73.40 9.00 0.0 7.132 
* Production Rate = 670 ADT/d • Production Rate = 300 ADT/d 
i = Willamette Industries Inc. i = Smufit Newsprint Corp. (Newberg) 
Trt VFiow VFiow BODu Cone Cost Trt VFiow VFiow BODu Cone Cost 
Opt (m3/ADT)' (ft3/s) (mg/L) (mil$/yr) Opt (m3/ADT)' (ft3/s) (mg/L) (mil$/yr) 
0 58.60 26.35 123.0 0.000 0 110.90 40.80 123.0 0.000 
45.45 20.43 123.0 1.340 1 88.00 32.37 123.0 1.134 
2 44.45 19.99 123.0 1.911 2 71.90 26.45 123.0 1.284 
3 44.45 19.99 61.5 5.082 3 71.90 26.45 61.5 4.376 
4 44.45 19.99 20.5 10.915 4 71.90 26.45 20.5 9.562 
All 44.45 19.99 0.0 13.832 All 71.90 26.45 0.0 12.155 
* Production Rate = 11 00 ADT /d * Production Rate = 900 ADT/d 
i = Smufit Newsprint Corp. (Oregon) i = Simpson Paper Co. 
Trt VFiow VFiow BODu Cone Cost Trt VFiow VFiow BODu Cone Cost 
Opt (m3/ADT)' (ft3/s) (mg/L) (mil$/yr) Opt (m 3/ADT)' (ft3/s) (mg/L) (mil$/yr) 
0 67.60 19.34 951.2 0.000 0 107.20 26.29 123.0 0.000 
57.50 16.45 951.2 0.439 77.20 18.93 123.0 0.507 
2 55.50 15.88 492.0 1.894 2 73.40 18.00 123.0 0.565 
3 55.50 15.88 123.0 3.757 3 73.40 18.00 61.5 3.770 
All 55.50 15.88 0.0 4.230 4 73.40 18.00 20.5 8.675 
All 73.40 18.00 0.0 11.128 
• Production Rate = 700 ADT/d • Production Rate =600 ADT/d 
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Tables B-18 to B-22: Athabasca River PPM Cost Data 
Note 1: Cost figures are in 1979 values and taken from E.G. Jordan [1979] and Eheart [Personal communication, 2002]. 
Note 2: The PPM production rates are taken from Macdonald and Hamilton [1989]. 
Note 3: Cost figures for the 100% removal treatment option (all) are extrapolated from the cost figures for the other 
treatment options. 
i = Welwood of Canada Ltd. i = Alberta Newsprint Company 
Trt BODS BODS Cost Trt BODS BODS Cost 
Opt Discharge Discharge (mil$/yr) Opt Discharge Discharge (mil$/yr) (kg/ADT)' (kg/day) (kg/ADT)' (kg/day) 
0 9.88 10868 0.000 0 4.20 2940 0.000 
8.26 9086 0.707 3.30 2310 0.319 
2 7.38 8118 0.924 2 3.20 2240 0.444 
3 3.69 40S9 4.300 3 1.60 1120 1.34S 
4 1.23 13S3 10.2S2 4 o.so 3SO 2.779 
All 0.00 0 13.228 All 0.00 0 3.430 
* Production Rate = 11 DO ADT /d * Production Rate = 700 ADT/d 
i =Millar Western Pulp Ltd. i =Alberta Energy Company (AEC) 
Trt BODS BODS Cost Trt BODS BODS Cost 
Opt Discharge Discharge (mil$/yr) Opt Discharge Discharge (mil$/yr) (kg/ADT)' (kg/day) (kg/ADT)' (kg/day) 
0 4.20 28S6 0.000 0 4.20 1470 0.000 
3.30 2244 0.311 3.30 11SS 0.189 
2 3.20 2176 0.433 2 3.20 1120 0.261 
3 1.60 1088 1.317 3 1.60 S60 0.860 
4 o.so 340 2.720 4 O.SO 17S 1.74S 
All 0.00 0 3.3S7 All 0.00 0 2.147 
* Production Rate = 680 ADT/d *Production Rate= 350 ADT/d 
i =Alberta Pacific Forest Industries Inc. 
Trt BODS BODS Cost 
Opt Discharge Discharge (mil$/yr) (kg/ADT)' (kg/day) 
0 9.88 14820 0.000 
8.26 12390 0.926 
2 7.38 11070 1.218 
3 3.69 SS3S S.SS3 
4 1.23 184S 13.S7S 
All 0.00 0 17.S86 
*Production Rate= 1500 ADT/d 
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Tables B-23 to B-33: Piecewise Linearization of the Willamette River WWTP Cost Data 
i = Metropolitan W!W Management Commission i = City of Salem i = City of Albany 
Piece Gadient, Gik Up Bound, Low Bound, Piece Gadient, Gik Up Bound, Low Bound, Piece Gadient, Gik Up Bound, Low Bound, 
No., (mil$/yr per Uik Lik No., (mil$/yr per Uik Lik No., (mil$/yr per Uik Lik 
k gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) k gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) k gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) 
-0.01 34.49 0.00 1 -0.01 99.87 0.00 1 -0.01 12.63 0.00 
2 -0.06 12.42 0.00 2 -0.02 35.95 0.00 2 -0.06 4.55 0.00 
3 -0.12 10.00 0.00 3 -0.05 28.96 0.00 3 -0.11 3.66 0.00 
4 -0.52 10.00 3.10 4 -0.21 28.96 8.99 4 -0.33 3.66 1.14 
i = City of Corvalis i = City of Newberg i = City of Wilsonville 
Piece Gadient, Gik Up Bound, Low Bound, Piece Gadient, Gik Up Bound, Low Bound, Piece Gadient, Gik Up Bound, Low Bound, 
No., (mil$/yr per Uik Lik No., (mil$/yr per Uik Lik No., (mil$/yr per Uik Lik 
k gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) k gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) k gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) 
-0.01 14.33 0.00 1 -0.02 3.66 0.00 1 -0.01 5.21 0.00 
2 -0.06 5.16 0.00 2 -0.13 1.32 0.00 2 -0.08 2.50 0.00 
3 -0.11 4.16 0.00 3 -0.18 1.06 0.00 3 -0.12 0.89 0.00 
4 -0.34 4.16 1.29 4 -0.62 1.06 0.33 4 -0.32 1.51 0.47 
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i = City of Portland i = T ri~City Service District i = Clackamas Co. Service District #1 
Piece Gadient, Gik Up Bound, Low Bound, Piece Gadient, Gik Up Bound, Low Bound, Piece Gadient, Gik Up Bound, Low Bound, 
No., (mil$/yr per Uik Lik No., (mil$/yr per Uik Uk No., (mil$/yr per Uik Uk 
k gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) k gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) k gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) 
0.00 207.04 0.00 1 -0.01 18.07 0.00 1 -0.01 26.03 0.00 
2 -0.02 74.53 0.00 2 -0.04 6.51 0.00 2 -0.03 9.37 0.00 
3 -0.04 60.04 0.00 3 -0.09 5.24 0.00 3 -0.07 7.55 0.00 
4 -0.18 12.42 0.00 4 -0.26 5.24 1.63 4 -0.17 1.56 0.00 
5 -0.19 47.62 18.63 5 -0.22 5.99 2.34 
i = Oak Lodge Sanitary District i = City of Canby 
Piece Gadient, Gik Up Bound, Low Bound, Piece Gadient, Gik Up Bound, Low Bound, 
No., (mil$/yr per Uik Lik No., (mil$/yr per Uik Uk 
k gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) k gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) 
-0.02 6.27 0.00 1 -0.03 2.08 0.00 
2 -0.09 2.26 0.00 2 -0.19 1.00 0.00 
3 -0.15 1.82 0.00 3 -0.30 0.35 0.00 
4 -0.43 1.82 0.56 4 -0.79 0.60 0.19 
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Tables B-34 to B-39: Piecewise Linearization of the Willamette River PPM Cost Data 
i = Pope and Talbot Inc. i = James River Paper Co. Inc. 
Piece Gadient, Gik Up Bound, Low Bound, Piece Gadient, Gik Up Bound, Low Bound, 
No., (mil$/yr per Uik Lik No., (mil$/yr per Uik Lik 
k gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) k gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) 
-0.04 53.36 0.00 -0.04 9.51 0.00 
2 -0.08 78.69 0.00 2 -0.21 10.32 0.00 
3 -0.23 78.69 26.23 3 -0.44 10.32 3.44 
i = Willamette Industries Inc. i = Smufit Newsprint Corp. (Newberg) 
Piece Gadient, Gik Up Bound, Low Bound, Piece Gadient, Gik Up Bound, Low Bound, 
No., (mil$/yr per Uik Lik No., (mil$/yr per Uik Lik 
k gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) k gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) 
-O.Q7 20.59 0.00 -0.03 49.97 0.00 
2 -0.10 36.37 0.00 2 -0.07 46.06 0.00 
3 -0.25 34.80 11.60 3 -0.17 46.06 15.35 
i = Smufit Newsprint Corp. (Oregon) i = Simpson Paper Co. 
Piece Gadient, Gik Up Bound, Low Bound, Piece Gadient, Gik Up Bound, Low Bound, 
No., (mil$/yr per Uik Lik No., (mil$/yr per Uik Lik 
k gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) k gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) (gBODu/s) 
-0.01 77.84 0.00 -0.02 28.87 0.00 
2 -O.ot 443.12 55.31 2 -0.10 31.35 0.00 
3 -0.23 31.35 10.45 
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Tables B-40 to B-44: Piecewise Linearization of the Athabasca River PPM Cost Data 
i = Welwood of Canada Ltd. i = Alberta Newsprint Company 
Piece Gadient, Gik Up Bound, Low Bound, Piece Gadient, Gik Up Bound, Low Bound, 
No., ($1 000/yr per Uik Lik No., ($1 000/yr per Uik Lik 
k kgBOD5/d) (kgBOD5/d) (kgBOD5/d) k kgBOD5/d) (kgBOD5/d) (kgBOD5/d) 
-2.20 4059 1353 -1.66 1120 350 
2 -0.63 4059 0 2 -0.66 1190 0 
3 -0.34 2750 0 3 -0.51 630 0 
i = Millar Western Pulp Ltd. i =Alberta Energy Company (AEC) 
Piece Gadient, Gik Up Bound, Low Bound, Piece Gadient, Gik Up Bound, Low Bound, 
No., ($1 000/yr per Uik Lik No., ($1 000/yr per Uik Lik 
k kgBOD5/d) (kg80D5/d) (kg80D5/d) k kg80D5/d) (kgBOD5/d) (kg80D5/d) 
-1.67 1066 340 -2.30 560 175 
2 -0.67 1156 0 2 -1.13 595 0 
3 -0.51 612 0 3 -0.60 315 0 
i =Alberta Pacific Forest Industries Inc. 
Piece Gadient, Gik Up Bound, Low Bound, 
No., ($1 000/yr per Uik Lik 
k kg80D5/d) (kgBOD5/d) (kgBOD5/d) 
-2.17 5535 1845 
2 -0.78 5535 0 
3 -0.32 3750 0 
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Table C-1: Before-trading wasteload allocation and cost figures for the Willamette River for the DO concentration standard of 5 mg/L 
Before-Trade Reliability 0.99 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 























PPM discharge allocation (gBODu/s) 
2. Pope & Talbot 
3. James River 
6. Willamette lnd 
9. Smufit (Newberg) 
12. Smufit (Oregon) 
13. Simpson 
%Reduction 
Total Discharge (gBODu/s) 
Total Savings (1999 $mil/yr) 


















































































































































































































































































































































Table C-2: After-trading wasteload allocation and cost figures for the Willamette River for the DO concentration standard of 5 mg/L 
Before-Trade Reliability 0.99 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 























PPM discharge allocation (gBODu/s) 
2. Pope & Talbot 
3. James River 
6. Willamette lnd 
9. Smufit (Newberg) 
12. Smufit (Oregon) 
13. Simpson 
Total Discharge (gBODu/s) 
Total Savings (1999 $mil/yr) 





























































32.4 65.2 66.9 66.9 66.9 
13.5 13.5 27.8 27.8 27.8 
11.9 11.9 24.5 24.5 24.5 
93.9 93.9 93.9 93.9 93.9 
~1 ~1 ~1 7.1 ~1 
4.9 10.1 10.1 10.1 10.1 
4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
17.0 17.0 35.1 35.1 35.1 
189.6 194.6 194.6 194.6 194.6 
5.9 12.2 12.2 12.2 12.2 
24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 
































































66.9 66.9 66.9 
27.8 27.8 27.8 
24.5 24.5 24.5 
93.9 93.9 93.9 
7.1 7.1 7.1 
10.1 10.1 10.1 
4.0 4.0 4.0 
35.1 35.1 35.1 
194.6 194.6 194.6 
12.2 12.2 12.2 
















































66.9 66.9 66.9 
27.8 27.8 27.8 
24.5 24.5 24.5 
179.4 193.7 193.7 
7.1 7.1 7.1 
10.1 10.1 10.1 
4.0 4.0 4.0 
35.1 35.1 35.1 
194.6 269.3 372.2 
12.2 12.2 12.2 





























Table C-3: Least-cost wasteload allocation and cost figures for the Willamette River for the DO concentration standard of 5 mg/L 
Before-Trade Reliability 0.99 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 























PPM discharge allocation (gBODu/s) 
2. Pope & Talbot 
3. James River 
6. Willamette lnd 
9. Smufit (Newberg) 
12. Smufit (Oregon) 
13. Simpson 
Total Discharge (gBODu/s) 
Total Savings (1999 $mil/yr) 



































































































































































































































































66.9 66.9 66.9 
27.8 27.8 27.8 
24.5 24.5 24.5 
193.7 193.7 193.7 
7.1 7.1 7.1 
10.1 10.1 10.1 
4.0 4.0 4.0 
35.1 35.1 35.1 
199.4 280.9 374.8 
12.2 12.2 12.2 





























Table C-4: Before-trading wasteload allocation and cost figures for the Athabasca River for the DO concentration standard of 5 mg/L 
Before-Trade Reliability 0.99 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.20 0.10 
WWTP discharge allocation (tonBOD5/d) 
1. Welwood 2.24 2.64 2.85 3.00 3.12 3.22 3.32 3.41 3.50 3.58 3.67 3.75 3.84 3.94 4.04 4.28 4.62 
2. Alberta Newsprint 1.43 1.68 1.81 1.91 1.98 2.05 2.11 2.17 2.23 2.28 2.33 2.39 2.45 2.51 2.57 2.73 2.94 
3. Millar 1.39 1.63 1.76 1.85 1.93 1.99 2.05 2.11 2.16 2.21 2.27 2.32 2.38 2.43 2.50 2.65 2.86 
4. Alberta Energy 0.71 0.84 0.91 0.95 0.99 1.03 1.06 1.08 1.11 1.14 1.17 1.19 1.22 1.25 1.29 1.36 1.47 
5. Alberta Pacific 3.06 3.59 3.89 4.09 4.25 4.40 4.53 4.65 4.77 4.88 5.00 5.12 5.24 5.37 5.51 5.84 6.30 
Uni Discharge (kg8005/ADT) 2.04 2.40 2.59 2.73 2.84 2.93 3.02 3.10 3.18 3.26 3.33 3.41 3.49 3.58 3.67 3.89 4.20 
Total Discharge (tonBOD5/d) 8.8 10.4 11.2 11.8 12.3 12.7 13.1 13.4 13.8 14.1 14.4 14.8 15.1 15.5 15.9 16.9 18.2 
Total Savings (1 979 $mil/yr) 17.7 20.3 21.7 22.7 23.5 24.2 24.8 25.4 26.0 26.5 27.1 27.6 28.1 28.7 29.3 30.0 31.0 
Total Cost (1979 $mil/yr) 22.0 19.5 18.0 17.1 16.3 15.6 14.9 14.3 13.8 13.2 12.7 12.1 11.6 11.0 10.4 9.7 8.8 
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Table C-5: After-trading wasteload allocation and cost figures for the Athabasca River for the DO concentration standard of 5 mg/L 
Before-Trade Reliability 0.99 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.20 0.10 
WWTP discharge allocation (tonBOD5/d) 
1. Welwood 
2. Alberta Newsprint 
3. Millar 
4. Alberta Energy 
5. Alberta Pacific 
Total Discharge (tonBOD5/d) 
Total Savings (1979 $mil/yr) 
Total Cost (1979 $mil/yr) 
4.06 4.06 4.06 4.06 4.06 4.06 4.06 4.06 4.06 
0.35 0.35 0.35 0.56 1.04 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 
0.34 0.34 0.72 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.20 1.55 1.90 
0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.89 1.16 1.16 1.16 
3.52 5.07 5.54 5.54 5.54 5.54 5.54 5.54 5.54 
8.8 10.4 11.2 11.8 12.3 12.7 13.1 13.4 13.8 
19.2 22.5 24.2 25.3 26.2 26.7 27.1 27.4 27.7 
20.6 17.2 15.5 14.4 13.5 13.0 12.6 12.3 12.0 
4.06 4.06 4.06 4.06 4.26 4.66 5.61 6.94 
1.12 1.44 1.79 2.14 2.31 2.31 2.31 2.31 
2.23 2.24 2.24 2.24 2.24 2.24 2.24 2.24 
1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 
5.54 5.54 5.54 5.54 5.54 5.54 5.54 5.54 
14.1 14.4 14.8 15.1 15.5 15.9 16.9 18.2 
28.0 28.3 28.6 28.9 29.2 29.6 30.4 31.5 
11.7 11.4 11.1 10.8 10.5 .10.2 9.4 8.3 
Table C-6: Least-cost wasteload allocation and cost figures for the Athabasca River for the DO concentration standard of 5 mg/L 
Before-Trade Reliability 0.99 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.20 0.10 
WWTP discharge allocation (tonBOD5/d) 
1. Welwood 
2. Alberta Newsprint 
3. Millar 
4. Alberta Energy 
5. Alberta Pacific 
Total Discharge (tonBOD5/d) 
Total Savings (1979 $mil/yr) 
Total Cost (1979 $mil/yr) 
1.54 2.37 2.89 3.28 3.62 3.79 3.95 4.06 4.06 
2.94 2.94 2.94 2.94 2.94 2.94 2.94 2.94 2.94 
1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.13 1.30 
1.47 1.47 1.47 1.47 1.47 1.47 1.47 1.47 1.47 
5.54 5.54 5.54 5.54 5.54 5.71 5.90 6.09 6.31 
12.6 13.4 13.9 14.3 14.6 15.0 15.3 15.7 16.1 
23.0 24.9 26.0 26.9 27.6 28.1 28.6 29.1 29.4 
16.7 14.9 13.7 12.9 12.1 11.6 11.1 10.7 10.4 
4.06 4.06 4.06 4.06 4.06 
2.94 2.94 2.94 2.94 2.94 
1.48 1.65 1.82 2.00 2.19 
1.47 1.47 1.47 1.47 1.47 
6.54 6.79 7.05 7.34 7.67 
16.5 16.9 17.3 17.8 18.3 
29.7 30.0 30.4 30.8 31.2 
10.0 9.7 9.3 9.0 8.5 
4.06 4.06 4.81 
2.94 2.94 2.94 
2.24 2.24 2.24 
1.47 1.47 1.47 
8.18 9.60 11.07 
18.9 20.3 22.5 
31.7 32.8 34.5 
8.1 7.0 5.2 
78 
